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1

CHAPTER 1: THE ARENA

“Now, I’m an optimist. I see signs of great hope. But it’s tough. The third rail of politics
– the third rail of life in the South – is race.”
Roy Barnes, as quoted in Atlanta Magazine (August 2015)
On February 12, 1971, Americus, Georgia was featured in Life magazine as having one
of the last American public school systems to fully integrate. Five years later, Habitat for
Humanity was founded at nearby Koinonia Farm and a human rights champion from Plains,
Jimmy Carter, was elected to the nation’s highest office. Carter’s insistence on raciallyprogressive policies began with his first elected position as a member of the Sumter County
Board of Education. In particular, he advocated for the consolidation of several disparate rural
schools. Just a couple decades later, many white children growing up in this one rural, southwest
Georgia county were educated with black classmates by black teachers and directed by black
principals at the elementary, middle, and high school levels.
This anecdote in the American narrative of race relations and racial educational progress
provides some brief insight of what has transpired since the landmark Brown v. Board of
Education decision in 1954. Integration and the provision of civil rights has allowed for the
potential of equal status educational settings for white and black Americans. However, existing
alongside this narrative is the equally-powerful story of segregated private academies, shuttered
business and industry, white financial retreatism, and growing poverty and crime in the same
rural, Southern communities that served as ground zero for integration in the middle of the
twentieth century. Broadly speaking, the characterization above carries with it a paradox of
extreme contrasts: Where have we succeeded? Where have we failed?
The broad research question underscoring this dissertation is: What are the contemporary
processes underpinning white racism? Social scientists have certainly exhausted themselves in
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trying to ascertain the fluid effects of our civil rights history, and they have done so while
broadening the analysis to include all racial groups in all areas throughout the United States. For
example, Black (2004) and Carmines (1989) demonstrate the role of race in holistic partisan
realignment, Glaser (1994, 2005, 2013) assesses the state of racism as it specifically relates to
public policy, and McClain et al. (1998, 2006) evaluates the intersection of black and emerging
Latino competition for the next generation of race scholars. The question is a giant one, and it is
not one easily answered. But I do consider that we may uncover and explain some changes that
have occurred, and I argue that we may do so most effectively if we first narrow our focus.
To begin, I will limit my study to the evaluation of white racism with regards to black
Americans. The historical evidence is more exhaustive in this conception than in others, and the
potential for exploring causal mechanisms with broader external validity is greater thus. Second,
I limit my study to the American South (most specifically, the Deep South). Although the
composition of several urban areas in other regions include large black populations, there is no
more fertile ground for evaluating race relations than in the very places that were the foci of civil
rights changes. The Deep South is where integration has affected the landscape of public
accommodations most completely due to an historically high concentration of black residents. In
assessing modern realities, I choose to focus on the place where the narrative is most complete.
Next, I choose to focus on a primary debate throughout the literature: racial threat and
intergroup contact. While these two causal mechanisms appear to be clearly at odds with one
another, a closer look uncovers that each may affect white racism in different ways. In essence,
the reality is not zero sum; both forces may move simultaneously, even within the same
individual. My theory suggests that while Deep South racial threat often persists in promoting
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discriminatory choices, intergroup contact has also had a definite effect on limiting white
prejudicial attitudes.
Articulating the differences between discrimination and prejudice alone is not necessarily
a novel enterprise. Sociologists have made that distinction a mandatory piece of introductory
textbooks (Thomas 2005). However, a careful review of the literature suggests that they have
often been confused or used interchangeably as a means of explaining the existence and
determinants of racism (for example, see Henry and Sears 2002). Criticisms of symbolic racism
follow this logic very closely in that they articulate that policy preferences are more so akin to
discriminatory behaviors than being solely evidence of prejudicial attitudes (Sniderman and
Piazza 1993). Unfortunately, this same criticism oftentimes falls short of actually showing where
“racially conservative” policy preferences do not align with individual attitudes and are simply
conservatism in general. On this point of explanation (and others akin to it) I seek to make the
greatest headway.
Logically, we see prejudice as a gateway towards discrimination. Conversely, we
typically assume that a lack of prejudice should lead to inclusive preferences or behaviors. What
I endeavor in this dissertation is to uncover a paradox of attitudes and behaviors that oftentimes
belies this logic and these assumptions. Additionally, I will build upon the soundest methods
available to focus on a specific geographic area of interest. I assert that the most complete
evidence of intergroup contact on the reduction of white prejudice may be gathered in the Deep
South. I also concede that this region is uniquely susceptible to racially-discriminatory behaviors
due to perceived threat.
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The specific contributions of this project are firstly methodological: I will clearly separate
prejudice from discrimination.1 I will seek to minimize social desirability bias while
acknowledging that it is pervasive. I will cross-reference contextual variables of reality and
perception to assess contact. And I will employ public as well as original research data explicitly
gathered for the purpose of studying the entirety of the Deep South. To my knowledge, the
previously mentioned steps have not been accounted for holistically in a single study. Secondly,
the broad contribution of this project is innovation as well as application: In assessing the
findings, we may hopefully employ a revised understanding of white racism to pave the way for
future education and policy prescriptions.
In practice, I will utilize national survey data to compare Deep South white prejudice to
that of the rest of the nation. If prejudice has decreased as a result of equal status contact, then
the difference between regions should be minimal. I will additionally utilize the same public data
to show the effects of racial context on prejudice in the Deep South. This starting point in testing
the hypotheses linked to my theory allows for an update and counterpoint to other academic
findings.
But due to a number of limitations in this and other national surveys, I will also present
the findings of a carefully-designed original survey and experiment. This original data will allow
me to pinpoint prejudice and discrimination while addressing much of the worrisome aspects in
the literature. I will present findings in the clearest way possible, regarding the debates over how
to measure and assess prejudice and discrimination. The “gap” that I perceive in our scholarship
to this point is not necessarily one of a lack of theories. Rather, it is the lack of a clear focus (and

1

Prejudice is defined as preconceived opinions divorced from reason or experience (Allport 1954). Discrimination
is generally defined as the unjust treatment of certain categories of people (Thomas 2005). The obvious separation
here is one of thought and action.
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cohesive theory) on a uniquely-situated geographic area combined with a host of methodological
complexities.
In the end, my prescription for white racism will not be definitive. My desire to
investigate this topic is obviously one deeply-rooted in my personal belief in racial equality. But
the systematic denial of equality and justice to black Americans has a long history in both mind
and in deed. Glaser and Ryan (2013) present a convincing case that our present realities do offer
an opportunity to “change minds if not hearts.” They argue that white discrimination may be
mitigated when the white ingroup calculus is transformed to include black neighbors. I argue that
hearts (or perhaps attitudes) have already changed. If my assertions are correct, then innovations
on their prescription may offer the next best hope for fully realizing equality and justice in the
Deep South.
1.1

Literature
Political research has reaffirmed Key’s (1949) original race thesis time and again for the

Old South. Key argued that Southern politics revolved around the relative social, economic, and
spatial positioning of African-Americans. Key utilized qualitative methods in compiling
exhaustive case studies on the politics of eleven “Deep South” states. Thus, the unique nature of
this classic work rests in its regional and historic specificity. Over five-hundred interviews were
conducted across these states in Part One. Key gave particular attention to gubernatorial elections
and administrations in each. In Part Two, Key assessed the phenomenon of Southern solidarity in
national politics. In Parts Three, Four, and Five, Key returned to a discussion of the states,
comparatively assessing the degree to which political phenomena were evident across state lines.
Ultimately, Key (5) theorized that “In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves
around the position of the Negro.” Thus, the broader significance of this work rests in Key’s
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insistence that racism was an important causal variable in Southern politics. Below, I examine
how Key’s “threat” hypothesis (with regard to the black belt) and his analyses of Southern
Democratic factionalism (with regard to disenfranchisement and electoral rules) served as
launching points for later scholarship dealing with race and politics.
Race relations, widespread poverty, and political nonparticipation were all central to
dysfunction in Southern Politics. However, Key argued that the problem of white and black race
relations undergirded the other two factors, especially in regions of the South with the highest
percentages of black residents. Specifically, the “threat” hypothesis focused discussion on
peculiarities of those regions wherein whites in small numbers grasped power and influenced
state and national politics disproportionately to their voting population. That central hypothesis
presented states: As the black population increased in Southern counties, attitudes of white
supremacy influenced politics with a higher frequency than in areas of lower black populations.
“When applied to politics white supremacy in its most extreme formulation simply means that no
Negro should vote.” (Key, 646)
Of utmost importance to the black belt hypothesis was the additional observation that
white dominance could not be conceptualized in terms of race alone. Rather, it was understood to
mean supremacy of those whites with elite status, or those referred to in the late nineteenth
century as the Bourbon elites. Key argued that white supremacist attitudes stemmed from the
reproduction of a model of racial supremacy born in the antebellum South. Thus, attitudes
developed among the white elites reflected the immediate threats they perceived that racial
relations had on economic conditions. To this end, he posited that (white elite) politicians from
the black belt would be the most vocal about maintaining white supremacy due to an “under
siege” mentality.
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Key offered a detailed characterization of white supremacy in the South, citing
differences between the paternalistic form of racism employed by elite whites and the
confrontational and outwardly violent racism practiced by poor whites (both inside and outside
of the black belt). Regardless of character, however, it is clear that those more passive
manifestations of white supremacist attitudes served as a political trump card. Key ultimately
argued that the policies of the wealthy, black belt landowner favored the wealthy, black belt
landowner.
To achieve white supremacy, Key argued that black belt whites regulated access to and
control of the institutions of political power. Key chronicled the systematic exclusion of black
voters in the South at the turn of the twentieth century. While the elimination of black voters
could be erroneously understood as a strategy to preempt “black supremacy” in politics, Key
maintained that white supremacy at the state level was never in question. Instead, he argued that
white elites in the black belt primarily sought to control politics within their own districts, and
the extension of this grasp on power translated to policies that limited inclusiveness throughout
Southern states.
In response to the extension of voting rights mandated by the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Populist uprising of the 1890s, Southern states employed poll taxes, literacy tests, residency
requirements, the grandfather clause (Louisiana), and white primaries (until 1944). Key argued
that these measures, while ultimately and effectively disenfranchising black voters, were not
aimed solely at limiting inclusiveness based on race: Key pointed to the exclusion of poor white
voters (especially outside of the black belt) as a secondary, but important, aim. As a result, he
noted that the mechanisms of maintaining white supremacy in the black belt served not to dictate

8

what racial group controlled the whole of Southern politics, but rather they served to ensure what
segment of the white population was in control.
The South, politically-dominated by minority interests, largely existed without a true
party system for much of its history. Instead, the Southern Democratic Party enjoyed a political
monopoly both within the black belt and across state and national politics. The
disenfranchisement in the South observed by Key limited a dimension of democracy later posited
by Dahl (1972): competitiveness. More recently, Aldrich’s (2011, 15) judgment that “democracy
fails when there is but one party” coincides precisely with Key’s classic analysis of Southern
dysfunction.
At the state and local levels, two-party competition was potentially detrimental to black
belt whites and their grasp on power. Instead, by further reinforcing white supremacy with a
party label, a static condition of the “Solid South” was locally maintained under the guise of
association with the national Democratic Party. Key argued that as power was increasingly
concentrated in the hands of black belt whites, factionalism prevailed more so than when that
same power was dispersed. He utilized the case studies of individual Southern (and former
Confederate) states to test this hypothesis.
Key asserted that, in practice, factions actually ruled Southern politics. White Southerners
tended to care less about the Democratic Party platform than they did about the potential utility
of maintaining a stranglehold on the political machinery through a single “party.” Factional
leaders held real political influence in these systems, and cults of personality provided the
foundation for political mobilization in particular campaigns.
Key noted that primaries within the one-party South often provided several candidates for
a single office. Thus, he viewed these primaries as factional competitions that were generally
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candidate-centered. An extension of these contests was the state-wide primary, in which the
personal appeal of specific candidates was utilized as capital in “winnable” districts.
Aggregated to the federal level, solidarity between Southern states was aided by the oneparty system. Key observed that regional interests dominated Southern Democrats in Congress,
and racial matters induced consensus. However, nonracial matters invited regular disagreement,
lending further evidence for Key’s primary thesis that racial conflict explained much of Southern
politics. In whole, coordination of the (Southern) party in government was more organized at the
national level than at the state or local level, and it was consistently dependent upon racial
attitudes.
Case studies of the 1928 and 1948 Presidential Elections provided further insight into the
basis of Southern solidarity. In counties consisting of low numbers of black residents, Hoover
actually won a large number of votes from non-black belt whites who balked at Smith’s
Catholicism. Only the black belt vote maintained unrivaled Democratic loyalty. Twenty years
later, Thurmond relied on that loyalty in his Dixiecrat bid. At that juncture, clear economic
alliances between wealthy agrarian interests and Southern industry could be observed. This
cooperation, combined with racial undertones, served as a testament to Key’s conclusion that,
“When racism triumphs within the South… the state party organizations are apt to assert their
independence because they are odds with the national majority.” (392)
And while an analysis of voting in national elections across the South indicated a
measure of partisan diversity within the electorate by 1949, Key’s analysis of Southern
Congressional voting from 1933 to 1945 painted a different picture. Entrenched Southern
Democrats in government cohered in voting behavior at a rate that superseded other voting blocs,
including that of non-Southern members. By and large, Southern Democrats stood together on
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policy matters, even to the point of colluding with Republicans in the Senate. Most telling,
though, is the finding that rural Southerners maintained solidarity at the highest rates in the
House.
Since the Civil Rights reforms of the 1960s and the end of de jure disenfranchisement
and segregation, the importance of race in New South politics has not waned (Giles 1977; Glaser
1994; Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997; Valentino and Sears 2005; Knuckey 2006, Acharya,
Blackwell and Sen 2016). However, important questions remain in identifying the processes by
which race currently influences Southern politics.
In recent years, the South’s economy has diverged greatly from its agrarian past.
Southern industrial and post-industrial employment now offers a rationale for the boom of
Sunbelt emigration. Apart from the continued presence of African-Americans in the traditional
black belt of cotton production, a large number of non-white Southerners also reside in several
urban areas (e.g. Atlanta).2 However, the shift in economic production and black “return
migration” has not been limited to these urban areas (Hunt, Hunt and Falk 2013). The black belt
has also experienced economic diversification, begging the question of whether modern racial
attitudes are consistent with the local (economic) realities that Key (1949) observed in the first
half of the twentieth century.
The primary focus of this review is to assess the state of the political science literature
with regard to three main areas: The South, Racial Attitude Formation, and Measuring Racial
Attitudes. Afterward, I offer two veins of research (largely) from other disciplines that provide
increasing depth and point of view for alternative theory-formation.

2

In 2010, the black population of the City of Atlanta accounted for 54% of the total population. In 1900, the black
population accounted for 40%. Source: United States Census Data WWW.CENSUS.GOV
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1.1.1

The Deep South
Key’s (1949) understanding of the geography of the South underpins his most compelling

argument on racial attitudes. It appears intuitive for many political scientists to still assume his
“threat” hypothesis of the black belt regarding the present-day South. He posited that white
supremacy was most prevalent in areas of high black populations (i.e. the black belt).
Coincidentally, the locus of much political power in the Deep South was also located in these
rural areas. His observation lends explanation as to why the policy preferences of Southern
politicians were so racially-conservative for nearly a century following the end of
Reconstruction.
Giles (1977) picks up on Key’s primary test by analyzing ANES data from the early
1970s. He corroborates with Key’s threat hypothesis, issuing an update of sorts following
landmark legislation in the 1960s. A careful critique of his methodology reveals problematic
interaction terms as well as an additive index to test for “attitudes.” Despite being focused on
national data, his analysis includes an argument for the continued use of contextual variables
when dealing with the South alone. Valentino and Sears (2005, 679) also argue that a focus on
what is considered the “Deep South,” as opposed to the South in general, is warranted: “The
South, and especially the Deep South, includes a disproportionate share of the highly racially
conservative whites.”
Glaser (1994) presents the most recent research strictly loyal to Key’s (1949) and Giles’
(1977) county unit of analysis; he concludes that a “threat” still exists in the black belt (at least
up to 1988). Primarily, Glaser utilizes contextual variables of demography to proxy for threat
(e.g. black population percentage). More recently, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2016) also
contend that Southern racism is more prevalent in areas of higher black populations. They
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incorporate new variables (historical economic inequality) to account for threat (or at least
historical and persistent racism). Outside of these findings, relatively little corroboration of the
“threat” hypothesis or any other alternative hypotheses exists within the recent political
literature.3
While Taylor (1998) contends that the modern South is still a prejudicial South, her
findings (within the sociological literature) are limited to data from 1990. She does directly
address the concentration of black residents within Southern locales and finds less evidence for
“threat;” however, the data she utilizes is limited in that it disproportionately samples from
metropolitan areas-only and lacks the specificity of neighborhood, zip code, municipality, or
even county-level individual predictors. Her analyses do not incorporate rural data whatsoever.
Giles and Buckner (1993) investigate whether threat leads to political decisions by
concentrating on the Louisiana Senate campaign of David Duke. They caution on the use of
aggregate data to infer individual factors and they, like Voss (1996), propose that contextual
threat may be overly-embraced. But each of these studies is anecdotal (focused on a narrow
geography and a highly-specific political campaign). Other important voting factors, such as
education, migration, and wealth, are introduced. To a large degree, the summation of both is
that racial threat should not be as directly related to political outcomes as in the past.
Carmines and Stimson (1981, 1986) and Carmines (1989) contend that white partisan
realignment in the Republican stronghold of the South first evolved out of racial attitudes.
However, they also contend that party identification has evolved. Whether or not racial attitudes
play a vital role on both sides of the aisle is somewhat controversial. Black (2004) argues that the
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Note that I am specifically referring to tests which are focused on the South alone. Although Voss (1996, 2000,
2004) has argued repeatedly for new research to holistically treat this area as distinct (and more critically delve into
contextual determinants), his research tends to direct criticism at how political scientists have defined and used
“context”.
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Democratic Party is now the party of racial inclusion, asserting that racist white voters would be
less-inclined to vote for Democrats. His ANES analysis clearly shows that race does matter for
party I.D., but he leaves room for debate on attitudes. It appears that the “Reagan Years” were
particularly formative for realignment. Black furthermore observes that, regardless of race, racial
attitudes, and a changing electorate, white men continue to dominate the “party in government.”
Taken altogether, race informs electoral behavior, but racism is perhaps another matter.
The South, then, is an enigma. We have diminishing empirical testing of threat to support
the notion that prejudice and discrimination are the driving forces for racism (and thus
party/policy preference) in racially-diverse areas. We also find that the political imperatives of
today’s South owe less to rural hoarding of power and more to a variety of evolving issues.
These policy issues may ultimately cut along racial lines, but the scholarship is conflicted on
causality. Glaser (2005) concludes that broad parallels to Key’s group conflict South are
justifiably-drawn. His case studies, reveal much continuity within the region as well as vested
interests in allowing racial conservatism to take root. Redistricting, he argues, increasingly
makes minority districts obsolete. However, he also later concedes that there are clear instances
in which group conflict is mitigated within communities (Glaser and Ryan 2013).
Ultimately, there are logical conundrums that go unanswered: If racism via threat is a
driving force for partisanship and policy preference, then why are voters in racially-diverse areas
(e.g. the black belt) still voting Democratic in higher proportions (Figure 1.1.1)? And, if
Republican strongholds actually exist in less racially-diverse areas, then how might we conclude
that racism via threat is the reason for continued racial political polarization in the South? 4

4

Racial bloc-voting is the obvious answer here, but we still have problems with continuing to assume Key’s logic
on white politicians maintaining white political supremacy. There must be alternative processes at play aside from
race, or there must be a mechanism by which white citizens in less-diverse areas have become more prejudiced.
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Note: Lighter-shaded areas denote higher percentages of votes for Hillary
Clinton (D). Darker shaded areas denote higher percentages of votes for
Donald Trump (R). Data Source: The Associated Press5

Figure 1.1.1 Deep South County-Level Results of the 2016 Presidential Election
I contend that the patterns of “red” and “blue” counties that persist best reveal attitudinal
prerogatives rather than behavioral ones. Modeling voting as an extension of identity (Campbell
et al. 1960) is well-documented in the political science literature. I do not discount the economic
merits of voting; rather I simply contend that the voting data may suggest deeply-held attitudes
more so than economic decisions. As McGann (2016) argues, the true question of voting
motivations is an empirical one. Thus, we must turn to the data.
To be clear, the analyses in this study do not fully explain the electoral phenomenon
depicted in the in the 2016 Presidential Election (consistent through several election cycles since
1984). Instead, the goal here is to evaluate contemporary white racial attitudes in the effort to
(first) uncover whether white prejudice is indeed more prevalent in the areas of increased black
populations.
For future projects, we may then update our empirical findings while also bringing to
light one of three potential electoral scenarios for future empirical research: 1) Black voters

5

“Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins.” NYTimes.com.
http://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/president (accessed November 20, 2016).
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overcome a significant racially-conservative white voting bloc in black belt areas (status quo
assumption); 2) Black voters simply outnumber a racially-ambivalent (but presumably more
Republican) white population in black belt counties (consistent with some limited modern
research)6; or 3) Black voters join with a newly-formed bloc of white voters who are less
racially-conservative (and presumably more Democrat) than in other areas in the Deep South
(this scenario would indicate a significant break with the status quo).
In attempting to uncover the foundations for these propositions, I find it particularly
helpful to not only limit my study to the “South” but, furthermore, to limit it to the “Deep
South.” The Deep South consists of those states wherein the black belt is contained. The
juxtaposition of both racially-homogenous and racially-heterogenous counties in the same
political state units provides an opportunity for clear comparative analysis. Going back to Key,
these state units include South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
1.1.2

The Construction of Racial Attitudes
Two competing theories of racial and political attitude structure dominate the political

science literature, both owing to a rational choice calculus. While other theories (such as the
principled politics model and social dominance theory) also exist alongside group conflict theory
and symbolic racism, those literatures have not been extensively-developed regarding Southern
politics. Furthermore, those theories do not specifically address the formation of racial prejudice
(rather they address alternative explanations for racially-divided outcomes). For the purposes of
this project, it seems appropriate to focus on those veins of research most applicable to the South
and to attitude formation.

6

See Sears, Sidanius and Bobo (2000) for a discussion on nation-wide declines in racial prejudice.
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Group conflict theory posits that individuals develop an “us” versus “them” mentality
with regard to racial group membership. Narrowly-conceived, politics is a “zero-sum” game and
individuals compete with those outside their racial group (Glaser 1994, 23). Bobo and Kluegel
(1993) provide some added dimension to this description, asserting that group competition may
not be the standard for attitude formation, but that it is extremely powerful when considering
racially-salient policy attitudes connected to race-targeting. Bobo and Kluegel present a paradox
of lessening support for these policies in the midst of supposed lessening hostility, even though
they do concede that attitudes do not necessarily have to be linked to that lack of support in the
1990 GSS they use. Regarding the South, Key’s (1949) “threat” hypothesis is grounded in this
theory of group conflict. Several New South analyses test and support the hypothesis, using
traditional (direct) prejudice as a barometer (Giles 1977; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Glaser
1994).
Blumer (1958) provides the theoretical foundation for defining prejudice as an outcome
of group conflict. His seminal essay argues that individual attitudes of prejudice may only be
rationally-realized through group membership. He provides an extensive discussion as to how
lower-status whites might be the most susceptible to developing prejudice out of fear that their
“superior” racial status might be threatened through competition. He argues that one must accept
a group membership first in order to adopt prejudiced feelings towards an out-group. He
proposes four characteristics of prejudice in this conception: 1) demand for superiority, 2)
feelings that the out-group is alien (different), 3) maintenance that out-groups do not deserve
privilege or advantage, and 4) that out-groups ultimately threaten the in-group. Furthermore,
Blumer contends that abstract stereotyping is utilized as a tool for perpetuating perceived
separation from the out-group in general (not necessarily individualized). Bobo and Hutchings
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(1996) directly test and confirm Blumer’s thesis of racial alienation using the 1992 Los Angeles
County Social Survey. They incorporate measures of job, political, housing, and economic
competition to assess the extent to which racial group membership leads to feelings that gains are
zero-sum. Whites perceptions of competition with blacks are particularly powerful in their
models.
Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman and Combs (1995) insert a compelling argument indirectly
linked to the usage of stereotyping (see also Gay 2004).7 They assert that black in-group
solidarity is more prevalent given higher percentages of in-group members (e.g. segregated
neighborhoods). Their data is gleaned from a National Science Foundation survey of Detroit-area
residents in 1992. Whereas integration of neighborhoods may negate solidarity, it also reduces
the level of prejudice “felt.” Thus, as Kaiser and Wilkins (2010) further argue, an individual’s
perception of conflict is important to forming a context of competition. For individuals in diverse
settings, the perception of conflict might actually be diminished, rather than heightened. Kaiser
and Wilkins make a noteworthy contribution methodologically in that they reject the assumption
that attitudes towards individuals are equally distributed amongst all members of the same racial
group.
According to the logic of Blumer (1958), the lack of contact with the out-group would
help to entrench stereotypes of the other while simultaneously creating the perception of threat
from the “outsider” alien group. On the surface, these arguments do not provide a foil to group
conflict theory; but they do issue a challenge to the logic behind Key’s (1949) contextual

7

Gay uses the concept of “linked fate” to operationalize the dependent variable on a 4-Point Likert scale. The
methods choices are problematic due to the number of interaction terms utilized without proper model specification
to account for those interactions. Gay finds that linked fate lessens as the neighborhood quality of life (income
levels, etc.) rises. Social engagement, however, increases.
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hypothesis with regard to the South. Furthering this challenge, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004,
260-261) acknowledge conflict (in the vein of Blumer) but also find that integrated educational
settings may combat the formation of prejudice: “While some theory suggests a curvilinear
relationship between the percentage of the population that is black and anti-black prejudice
(Blalock, 1967), no study of which we are aware indicates a definitive point at which animosity
towards blacks recedes.” Their study links GSS and Census data from 2000.
Symbolic racism posits that political conflicts that divide the public along racial lines
actually reflect values and beliefs that are commonly associated with concepts of “whiteness” or
“blackness.” While on the surface, symbolic racism in the New South looks like a “white” versus
“black” contest, it is actually dependent upon the racial constraints that individuals perceive for
specific issues (i.e. advancement of civil rights and government assistance). Kinder and Sears
(1981) argue that political conflicts do not reflect overt prejudice based on race; rather, they
assert that the “battle lines” are drawn on policy (see also Abramowitz 1994; Oliver and
Mendelberg 2000). In essence, this conception of racism maintains that racial division in politics
is not necessarily based on race alone but rather the ideological differences of blacks and whites
that retain latent vestiges of racism.
Henry and Sears (2009) explore symbolic racism with regard to the lifespan of
individuals’ policy preferences. They assert that attitudes are largely consistent once adulthood is
reached. They contend that ideological differences are particularly susceptible to divergence in
the earlier years of life while “leveling off” once the age of eighteen is reached. Logically, this
conclusion lends to an examination of educational contexts, particularly those affected by
integration. Symbolic racism is sometimes referred to as a form of modern racism (James et al.
2001), as it may be subtler and indirect.
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At its core, symbolic racism is presented in the political science scholarship as an
innovation on how to assess racist attitudes within the context of a modern world where explicit
racism is harder to observe. Due to social desirability bias, the proponents of using the symbolic
racism scale point to the difficulty in gathering reliable data without some means of “ferreting
out” implicit racial bias with specific regard to policy imperatives. Sears and Henry (2001) have
offered the following as the most pervasive indicators of such implicit racial bias: 1) “Blacks no
longer face much prejudice or discrimination;” 2) “The failure of blacks to progress results from
their unwillingness to work hard enough;” 3) “Blacks are demanding too much too fast;” and 4)
“Blacks have gotten more than they deserve.” In summation, the usage of such an innovation as
symbolic racism is a choice of methodological preference. But it is a preference (if utilized) that
does not square with the delineation of prejudice and discrimination that I offer in my theory.
The most direct challenge to the utility of symbolic racism comes in the form of the
principled politics model (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). A basic explanation of how this model
compares might be best illustrated on a continuum of “how much” direct prejudice applies. For
group conflict, prejudice is a clear determinant for establishing subsequent political choices. For
symbolic racism, prejudice exists “in the background” as an informer of political choices, but not
as a determinant. In principled politics, prejudice has receded to the point where it does not
clearly affect political choices. Thus, this model contradicts symbolic racism on the grounds that
too much of what is measured by the symbolic racism scale may actually be attributed to genuine
policy preferences that go beyond race.
While the development of these theories is substantial on the aggregate level, the relative
lack of current empirical study on racial attitudes juxtaposed with political behaviors across the
Southern landscape offers no answers in assessing shifts that may have occurred in the recent
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past. Simply put, these efforts assume an intractable measure of racial division that exists within
one of either two models. On the one hand, group conflict suggests that racial conflict (via threat)
leads to political realities. On the other hand, symbolic racism suggests that expressed political
preferences lead to furthered racial division because the outcomes of racial threat are only
masked. Any differences uncovered between attitudes and policy preferences are “explained
away” with social desirability bias.
Causality is the barrier to understanding here. Accepting these theories for the formation
of attitudes and the expression of racism is dependent upon ignoring the power of the other.
Coupling them together likewise necessitates the acceptance of circular reasoning. Obviously,
the processes underlying attitude formation are fluid and changing in the South as in all areas.
Reconciling the models in the present requires a more detailed look into what occurs within and
between areas that differ in racial composition and context. Reconciling the models as applied to
the South requires a more detailed look into the South. Lastly, reconciling the models requires a
more detailed look into how racial context “fits” into theories of attitude formation in general.
1.1.3

Other Efforts in Measuring Racial Attitudes
In order to accurately assess racial attitudes in the Deep South of today, three broad

methodological issues appear to take precedence. First, measures of prejudice that fail to
incorporate a calculus based in group membership fail to accurately capture the relative social
distance that individuals perceive between their in-group and out-groups (Blumer 1958, Bobo
and Hutchings 1996, McClain et al. 2006). Also, measures of implicit attitudes are, by nature,
problematic because they rely on uncovering that which cannot be readily observed. Bobo (1983,
1200), for instance, offers a critique of early symbolic racism development in stating, “Such a
formulation of self-interest treats subjective reactions to… contact with blacks as irrelevant or,
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more likely, presumes that they will be negative.” Bobo essentially argues that an assumption of
threat without any regard to how intergroup contact might mitigate racism is faulty (or too
presumptuous).
Bobo incorporates factor analysis in assessing that the presumption is too narrow in
focus. His analyses of 1972 and 1976 NES data yield that opposition to policies indicate a
resistance to threat by an out-group in general, regardless of race. The self-interest prerogatives
of symbolic racism belie the power of group membership generally: “.... Racial Intolerance (2)
scores and Segregationism (2) scores increase as neighborhood racial composition moves from
largely black to largely white.” (1207)
Outside of the considerable (and methodologically-complex) development of the updated
symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry and Sears 2002), political scientists have often relied on
additive indices (Giles 1977) or convenient proxies (Glaser 1994) that oftentimes more readily
measure actions as opposed to beliefs (e.g. vote choices). The theoretical controversies of
symbolic racism, as well as the substantial critiques of measures rife with social desirability bias,
have led to considerable difficulty in developing a consensus. Fisher (1993, 303) defines this sort
of bias as “systematic error in self-report measures resulting from the desire of respondents to
avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others.”
Subsequently, it has become incumbent upon the researcher to utilize simplified methods
to capture explicit prejudice within the context of how one views himself and his in-group (while
simultaneously limiting social desirability bias). Ditonto, Lau and Sears (2013) concur on this
point, offering that perhaps political scientists (including Sears) have spent too much time in
trying to uncover hidden prejudice. They maintain that traditional (or explicit) measures of
prejudice do a better job of predicting policy attitudes on racial issues. In particular, the “Affect
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Misattribution Procedure” performs poorly in this analysis and appears to be a severe stretch
methodologically.
Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) appears to offer an attractive compromise on all counts
(see also Dixon 2006). They utilize a simple additive index of responses to the 2000 GSS that
captures the relative distance between how whites perceive themselves in relation to other racial
groups on three dimensions of traditional stereotyping. This measure limits bias by using a series
of questions not targeting any specific prejudice towards any specific group; rather, it gauges a
general “feeling” across different intervals of survey items. These studies additionally confront
the central discussion of threat and contact; the conclusion is that threat may exist, but it is
dependent upon individual-level choices and much further work is necessary to flesh-out the
ultimate determinants.
Secondly, the demographic contextual variables utilized in most research are simply too
limited in scope. Giles and Buckner (1993) and Voss (1996) provide two examples of
scholarship that address contextual racial threat in a very limited geographic area (Louisiana)
within the framework of a racially-charged political campaign (David Duke). The external
validity of these studies is dubious at the outset (even within the Deep South). Hopkins (2016), in
fact, questions the validity of using contextual variables at all. He argues that, for the most part,
the empirical challenges (e.g. multiple contextual levels, ecological fallacy, etc.) are too manifest
to rely upon such variables. However, he does cite racial and ethnic contexts as perhaps being the
exception to the rule (if based in sound theory).
Many social scientists cite metropolitan areas used in the General Social Survey to
approximate intergroup threat or contact (Glaser 1994, Taylor 1998, Dixon 2006). But these
areas do not fully-represent rural populations, nor do they contain more specific means of
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assessing specific local populations (i.e. zip codes). Surely, survey items that inquire about
workplace composition, number of black friends, etc. may be utilized. However, self-selection
remains a problem by operationalizing in this fashion; after all, respondents may be describing
outcomes of attitude-formation rather than the process itself.
The problem of self-selection diminishes (but does not entirely vanish) with the use of
linked-aggregate data. Subsequently, one is left with a choice between two problematic
alternatives (self-selection or ecological inference). Baybeck (2006) directly addresses these
demographic “problems.” He proposes reporting on hierarchical levels of geographic residence
as well as incorporating demographic perception as an interaction term. Essentially, single
measure are not particularly accurate ones. These suggestions appear most prudent when
provided both specific geographic data as well as demographic perception data. The moderating
variable in this sort of model is the actual demographic makeup of an area whereas the mediating
variable is the individual’s perception of threat or contact within the area. Interestingly, he also
contends that factor analysis has been under-utilized to account for these contextual
complexities.
Lastly, problems of measurement confound many of the observational methods utilized to
date. That is, one must assume that prejudiced attitudes may be accurately estimated via
questionnaires. For substantive political logic, one must also assume that those attitudes (when
captured) actually manifest into some real-world outcomes. Although these assumptions are
often commonplace and acceptable for social science research, a simple solution exists:
experimental methods. Coupling observational analyses of prejudice (what people think) with
experimental analyses of discrimination (what people do) presents perhaps the most
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comprehensive path towards answering the fundamental questions about the Deep South that are
treated here.
In the following section, I introduce new perspectives that provide potential theoretical
pathways into furthering the discussion of prejudice vis-à-vis discrimination.
1.1.4

Alternative Research
First articulated within social psychology, Allport (1954) posits that encountering

different races regularly can reduce racial conflict and prejudice:
“Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the
individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between
majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The
effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by
institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere),
and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common
interests and common humanity between members of the two
groups.” (281)
Extending to political science, intergroup contact theory might also induce political outcomes
that are not prejudice-dependent. Simply put, if the attitudes of black belt whites have been
changed by integration since Key (1949), then it seems reasonable for political scientists to
consider whether the integration of public schools has provided the means.
This theory (see also Pettigrew 1998) is clearly opposed to group conflict theory and
suggests a mechanism by which symbolic racism may be mitigated; refining this theory offers
the opportunity to ascertain how attitudinal shifts have been made possible in the “New South”
in regard to prejudice and (ultimately) discrimination. In offering an explanation for current
phenomena that is not widely-accepted within the political science literature, I contend that this
particular theory provides a current account that is lacking and a starting point for further
research. Dixon (2006) does provide a detailed description of the “dueling” processes of threat
and contact, but he concludes that both are essentially plausible in attitude formation. His

25

analysis stops short of addressing discrimination or the South directly, and he neglects to offer an
explanation as to how threat persists despite integrated educational contexts.
Further contrary to the group conflict theory strongly supported in Key’s (1949) analysis
of the Old South, intergroup contact theory is not dependent upon disenfranchisement and civil
inequality. Rather, it supposes the possibility of de facto social equality that stems from decades
without Jim Crow and an end to de jure inequality since Allport (1954). In addressing the
condition that both white and black citizens can share in some common social, political, or
economic goals; I acknowledge that intergroup contact is clearly is at odds with the persistence
of symbolic racism as well. In Allport’s conception, prejudice that emerges in spite of intergroup
contact is simply irrational.
“Whereas a substantially rational calculus underlies racial conflict in the self-interest
model, a psychological and largely irrational calculus underlies the classical prejudice model
(Jackman 1994, 954).” Motivated reasoning, of any sort, is the process by which judgments are
guided by prior-attained desires and feelings. Kunda (1999) refers to this type of reasoning as
“hot cognition.” Contrary to “cold-cognition,” which is based on deliberative, information-driven
processes, hot cognition allows for biases, prejudices, and potentially-unrelated goals to enter
into the decision-making process at specific moments. The motivated reasoning that Kunda
describes actually may drive the processing of information in particular ways (depending upon
individual and contextual factors). Thus, she argues that we are Bayesian, but “imperfect.”
For decades, motivated reasoning was dismissed as a viable explanation for certain
cognitive phenomena. Ostensibly, the desire to “thicken” rational models (rather than allow for
different processes) fueled this conclusion. Recent research, however, has explored motivated
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reasoning systematically and across the social sciences. Since Kunda (1987, 1990, 1999),
political science has also jumped on board.
Primarily, for my discussion here, I will narrow the focus to allow for a discussion on
how directional motivated reasoning in expressed attitudes or opinions (e.g. discriminatory
choices) may tap-into “irrational” or “imperfect” prejudices not necessarily based in a rational
prejudicial model. The goal of the individual who reasons in this fashion is to arrive at an
ultimate judgment which is aligned with a particular direction (e.g. racially-prejudicial) while not
necessarily intending to do so on the merits of prejudice alone. Clearly, political research in this
vein seems logical.
Experimental methods have been put to great use by political scientists seeking out
evidence of motivated reasoning. Taber and Lodge (2006) find that their test subjects are
“unable” to come to conclusions independent of their directional goals, regardless of information
updates (i.e. affirmative action). Thus, in contrast to the normative ideal Evans and Over (1996)
put forth, Taber and Lodge assert that moderating the power of directional motivation in such a
manner may well be a fool’s errand. Ultimately, they argue that we are all motivated in our
reasoning.
Druckman (2012) offers a careful critique of Taber and Lodge’s work that builds upon
the caveats in Druckman and Bolsen (2011). He asserts that accuracy motivations may play a
more pivotal role in the expression of political attitudes. Indeed, the dual goals of seeking
accuracy while also protecting a cultural identity (Kahan 2015) may form the basis of an internal
tug-of-war. Citing Bolsen et al. (2011), Druckman reports that individuals who are induced to
seek accuracy are inclined to form judgments beyond a partisan motivation (or racial motivation

27

for my purposes here). Ultimately, he concludes that individual- and contextual- level factors
may mediate or moderate the extent to which differing forms of motivated reasoning manifest.
The scholarship in assessing individual- and contextual-level factors is developing and
not without controversy (as mentioned previously in measuring racial attitudes). Ambivalence is
cited as one such individual factor. “Need for cognition” is another. Kahan (2013, 2015), for
instance, reports that individuals with high cognition needs are actually more likely to engage in
partisan motivated reasoning. However, Nir (2011) finds evidence to the contrary. Nisbet et al.
(2013) differentiate between “open-minded” and “closed-minded” individuals to conclude that
some people are simply more or less malleable when confronted with new information. But it is
uncertain, methodologically, whether or not “closed-mindedness” aligns with a low need for
cognition in their study. All in all, the most compelling evidence seems to be gathered by Kahan,
who echoes Druckman’s critique by demonstrating that (yes) partisan motivating reasoning
exists, but that it does not rest solely with a closed-minded, ambivalent, and ignorant mass of
people. Instead, an individual may be persuaded by context to seek out partisanship or accuracy.
Later, I contend that racial context may be included here, as well.
Contextual-level factors, such as repeated exposure, social acceptance, or perceived
competition/conflict can induce accuracy-seeking (Chong and Druckman 2007). Anxiety, as
well, can prompt individuals to further rely on the most-trusted (or correct) information they
have gathered. Druckman and McDermott (2008), for instance, provide compelling observational
evidence for the power of frames in moderating partisan motivated reasoning. Their work
explores the range of contextual emotions, finding that those that feel uncertain or distressed
choose to seek accuracy by deferring to frames (instead of their gut). Glaser and Ryan (2013)
provide additional linkage to this assertion on racially-salient issues.
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All in all, it is clear that directional motivated reasoning is a force in making political
judgments. However, the strength of this singular force is not absolute. Neither unbounded
rationality nor a desire to protect one’s tribe hold total sway over attitudes and opinions. Instead,
a range of personal factors and a varying world of information and changing circumstances allow
the freedom to tap into that force which is most useful to us at any given time (be it partisanship,
accuracy, or racial discrimination).
1.2

Theory
Given the widely-held causal assumption that race plays a formative role in the South

(and thus our understanding of Southern Politics), a logical framework must be articulated for
moving forward. Firstly, we must recognize that the political science literature tends to treat the
overall subject as one of race within extant political processes (racialized politics) or political
processes within extant racial contexts (the politics of race). Race, being a socially-constructed
phenomenon itself, is a particularly troublesome topic in reconciling these dual conceptions
simultaneously. In a state of nature, the game of politics may exist without regard to race. I claim
that I may seek to obtain or assert political agency regardless of who I am dealing with. Thus, the
existence of race may be understood to be potentially endogenous to politics itself (that is, new
politics that emerge when individuals have differing physical characteristics and choose to make
these differences salient).
I assert that institutionalized racism8 remains as the appropriate construct for political
scientists to consider when evaluating how racial inequality may be explained. For in examining
the phenomena that evolve following the “injection” of race, we may understand how and why

8

That is, racial inequality as a status quo de facto reality, stemming from systemic intergroup social, political, and
economic interactions (Klitgaard 1972).
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racial groups seek to maximize political utility. Furthermore, as political institutions change
alongside established (but also changing) racial contexts, political scientists may more accurately
evaluate political realities given an established state of the world.
Understanding the role of race in individual-level Southern Politics must alternatively
begin with an acknowledgment of institutionalized racism as the proper basic assumption. Rather
than assuming a causal mechanism whereby “racism leads to politics of a certain kind,” we must
start with an understanding that political processes form first, and racial contexts emerge and
evolve later as a hallmark of creating systemic inequality. Omi and Winant (1986) provide a
strong theoretical base for this conception. They argue that race is a constructed identity, heavily
dependent upon the inequalities that exist prior to and during the construction. The further
processes described in the alternative research of Allport (1954) and Kunda (1999) articulate the
threads of specific development with regard to attitudes and behaviors that manifest as race is
being concurrently constructed. After accepting this premise of a fluid process, analyses of the
contemporary state of Southern Politics may be more clearly undertaken.
The established reality of racial inequality is thus not prima facie evidence of “racism”
for individuals, but rather it is clear empirical evidence of a political system that persists in
unequally promoting the goals of historically-privileged racial groups. But democratic political
and social processes allow for change, and so in articulating this conceptual framework I allow
for the possibility that institutionalized racism itself might change. That change, however, must
begin with individual-level causal mechanisms that limit prejudice (in attitude formation) and
discrimination (in political preference).
It is quite surprising that a unifying theory has not been put forth in an attempt to explain
changes in individual-level Southern political calculi. Our scholarship suggests that we can
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accept at the very least that the advent of legal and social changes in the American South have
allowed for the possibility of prejudicial or discriminatory changes. But, given the dearth of
research on race, we should also be able to clearly delineate between the determinants of
prejudice and discrimination. It appears that much effort in attempting to explain the politics of
the contemporary American South gets “lost in translation” in improperly equating prejudice
with discrimination or simply stating that measures of one or both of these individual variables is
evidence of “racism”. Similarly, the unequal state of nature (systemic racism) is oftentimes
framed as a simplistic “soul writ large” rather than as perhaps a critical and primal actor itself.
To improve upon our prior efforts, I find it necessary to join two diverse literatures
(largely) outside the purvey of political science with that of the rational choice race literature
within political science. The alternative literatures explore two central topics: 1) intergroup
contact and 2) motivated reasoning. It is my mission to explain more succinctly how
contemporary Southern social and political structures allow for limiting explicit prejudice while
(at the same time) promoting discrimination in singular political/economic decisions.
I frame my alternative theory here. I first accept systemic, institutionalized racism as the
state of the world for the American South. I identify the historically-privileged group as selfidentified white Southerners. I then assume that current realities are path-dependent upon
changes to political institutions that have occurred since the middle of the twentieth century (e.g.
the integration of public accommodations, especially schooling). Lastly, I narrow my focus to the
related (but not identical) predictors of racial inequality towards black Southerners. I do not
consider that accepting the current state of the world negates the possibility that systemic racism
may still be affected by these predictors (discrimination and prejudice). Inequality is not
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presently intractable via pervasive law; rather, it is undergirded by pillars of action and thought
(see Figures 1.2.1 – 1.2.3).
The intent of presenting the changing nature of racism using these models is not
predicated on accepting that law and policy fail to exhibit characteristics that have inequitable
results. Instead, the intent is to display the fact that federal law has mandated that they should not
(on their face). Critical theory establishes, in part, that all structures may entrench inequities.
That contention is not being challenged or treated here. This effort is intended to use what data
suggests (earnings gaps, incarceration rates, etc.) as the prior information necessary to state that a
system of racism exists regardless of contradictions of law or insidious vested racial interests.
The foundation for the observed racism that exists within the formal institutions is then
conceived to be a product of the individual thoughts and actions of those that operate within the
structure.

Figure 1.2.1 The Antebellum Construct of Systemic Racism (Pre-1870)
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Figure 1.2.2 The Jim Crow Construct of Systemic Racism (1870-1974)

Figure 1.2.3 The Contemporary Construct of Systemic Racism (1974-Present)
I contend that changes in American political institutions have lessened white prejudice
towards black out-groups while further entrenching discriminatory behaviors towards all
perceived out-groups. This theory is not necessarily limited to the Deep South, where
demography has allowed for social integration to be realized most fully (e.g. educational
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settings) within the context of frequent close-encounters with racial out-groups. It should,
however, be tested there first. Therefore, the developmental processes described by Allport
(1954) and Blalock (1967) are accepted for individual attitudes. Paradoxically, though, the
group-level rational choice processes described by Blumer (1958) are also conditionally accepted
(though with less distinction given to group membership and more of a consideration to
individual-level calculi). As a corollary to Blumer, the “hot cognition” of Kunda (1999) plays a
role in specific choices in specific settings, as individual-level calculi are susceptible to intervals
of directional motivated reasoning.

Figure 1.2.4 The Contemporary Process affecting Systemic Racism (1974-Present)
To summarize in plain language (see Figure 1.2.4), I posit that white Southerners (in the
aggregate) have become less prejudiced while maintaining high levels of discriminatory
tendencies. The most extreme divergence of these variables should be observed where white and
black individuals live in close proximity to one another. The demographic racial context,
therefore, has emerged as a powerful predictor for current Deep South political reality, owing to
an historical persistence of highly-salient racial inequality in that geographic area as well as the
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increased probability that salience of that kind frames decisions racially. Again, the Deep South
(as defined originally by Key) holds the potential for evaluating these processes most fully.
Those states that contain the black belt are not only the historic “ground zero” for
evaluating the intersection of race and politics, but they are also critical in the present-day. The
durable demographic characteristics of the rural regions of these states (permitting high
intergroup contact between blacks and whites) yields much more useful data than a study that
also includes largely white Southern regions (e.g. Appalachia). Certainly, there is a story to be
told in regard to the traditionally-recognized “Upper South” (North Carolina, Virginia,
Maryland, etc.) or even looking west towards Texas. But it has been made clear within the
literature that does cover the South that something is inherently different about what is defined as
the Deep South. Since Key spent considerable time defining the black belt as the cradle of white
supremacy in his day, I have chosen to test my contradictory theory in the very same place. At
the very least, we can logically assume larger shifts in wider geographic areas if there are clear
shifts here.
This theory blends together the processes of belief formation with those of group
identification and decision-making. Controversially, perhaps, I even offer that individual-level
rational choice is much more salient in this conception – that is, white individuals should also
discriminate more readily towards other white individuals, as more “players” now exist within
the racially-integrated game of acquiring social, political, and economic power. Economically,
the scope of the conflict (Schattschneider 1960) has broadened, owing largely to legal
protections but also to cultural shifts.
The implications of this theory are far-reaching. Though I limit my current study to a
specific region here, I do so as a form of “toughest test.” If the results bear-out that changes have
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indeed occurred, then I see no reason why further hypothesis-testing should not be carried out for
other areas of the country. Again, however, I would caution that history does play a critical role.
Some battles (so to speak) have already been fought in the Deep South. Elsewhere, those battles
may have yet to be realized. It is that history that I will try to bring into clearer focus in the next
Chapter.
2

CHAPTER 2: “RECONSTRUCTION” 1870 – 1974

"What a marvelous moment for baseball. What a marvelous moment for Atlanta and the
state of Georgia. What a marvelous moment for the country and the world. A black man
is getting a standing ovation in the Deep South for breaking a record of an all-time
baseball idol. And it is a great moment for all of us, and particularly for Henry Aaron,
who was met at home plate, not only by every member of the Braves, but by his father
and mother.”
Vin Scully, Dodgers Radio Network (April 8, 1974)
My theory is dependent upon a key major assumption: Deep South racism is an
institution that has developed over time. Most specifically, I contend that major shifts have
brought us to the point that the primary supports of racism are individual-level discrimination
and prejudice. The nature and form of that institution obviously informs what is “happening” in
the present. Carmines (1989) has conducted a comprehensive process-tracing on race in
American politics. Using Darwinian logic as a lens into the construct of racism, he highlights the
way in which race has continually shaped the nature of political alignment beyond the “Civil
Rights Era.” I largely agree, though I choose to start with actions and thoughts rather than
political realignment.
Several historians in the latter half of the twentieth century have described that era as a
“Second Reconstruction” (Woodward 1957) that coincided with statutory and common law
changes aimed at civil equality for black Americans (particularly in the South). I argue that
Reconstruction, as a concept, began with the Fifteenth Amendment and ended only with broad
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cultural acceptance of black Americans holding some equal-status roles in society by the early
1970s. Recent years have seen the birth of the phrase “white-lash,” describing a reaction to that
cultural shift. But, during the period of Reconstruction that I describe, systemic racism (as we
know it) was developed and cultivated. Akin to Carmines, I intend to present historical evidence
of the organic and changing nature of racism generally.
The logical argument to back these assertions up is quite simple. It would be naive to
suggest that Jim Crow was simply a continuation of past institutions. Instead, it was a structured
plan executed to specifically deal with new times. It subsequently birthed a new racialized
reality, not dependent upon slavery. With constitutional law no longer protecting inequalities
based on race alone, inequalities clearly observed and perpetuated afterward were the product of
a series of economic, social and state-level political decisions. These decisions were specifically
targeted, for the greater part of the Reconstruction era, at subjugating black Americans as
second-class citizens in the Deep South.
Through time, however, challenges to Jim Crow gradually led to (aforementioned) legal
and policy changes (e.g. Executive Order 9981, Brown v. Board of Education, Civil Rights Act of
1964). These decisions are also part of the story of Reconstruction, and they add depth and
dimension to the discrimination and prejudice that have always been the bulwark of what we
observe regarding racism. But they do not mark the end of the story.
Ultimately, the “Reconstruction” presented here is not the history of a region made-over.
Instead, it is a brief history of how racism as we know it was constructed and re-constructed from
1870 to 1974. The shifts in attitudes and behaviors I describe in my theory for the contemporary
Deep South are not solely a result of landmark political events. They are a result of the nature of
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racism itself being changed over time (owing to the legal pillars as well as the individual-level
pillars).
Cultural context can color the rational and “irrational” individual-level pillars with
perhaps more meaningful data than our models can describe. At the conclusion of nearly every
historical discussion on the Civil Rights Era, singling-out a particular date for “change” becomes
a tough proposition (just as discussing “change” alone). Identifying any specific year (such as
1974) can be even more problematic. As I described in Chapter 1, the early 1970s in Southwest
Georgia were pivotal for racism in that time and in that place. However, I contend that the Deep
South as a whole experienced a like change during that particular period. For the first time,
young Southern schoolchildren entered truly integrated public schools in the early 1970s. The
proof that this time period was consequential for the entirety of the region can be found in
federal court mandates throughout the South (i.e. Coweta County School District) that persist to
this day.9 But even the rendering of dated court decisions does not provide enough specificity.
Instead, I choose to point towards 1974 for cultural import. For the whole region (and
perhaps a nation), one night in the early spring stands-out singularly. As Vin Scully made his 715
call on Dodgers Radio, two young, white Georgians ran past security and onto the field at
Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium. They did not try to impede Henry Aaron’s trip around the bases;
they celebrated with him. But despite that open and public acceptance, tens of thousands of
letters of hate mail rested in boxes at the Aaron residence. 10

9

In the specific case of Coweta County, efforts to create magnet programs or open enrollment have been denied as
recently as 2000.
10
In 2014, Mr. Aaron gave an interview on the 40th anniversary of his achievement. During the interview, he
criticized several national political figures on their treatment of then-president Barack Obama. The Atlanta Braves
immediately began to receive a rash of new hate mail directed towards Aaron. Broadly conceived, these events
further convey a paradox of acceptance and condemnation (i.e. “white-lash”).
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To be clear, I do not hold that the middle-aged and young adults in the crowd at that
game were suddenly transformed. In fact, the lack of formal adulation by the white establishment
of the era upset Aaron considerably. What I do offer, though, is that the moment Aaron broke
Ruth’s record survives as a symbolic event that goes far beyond simple sport. Atlanta became the
home of the first Deep South major professional sports franchise in 1966. A black Southerner
from Mobile, Alabama (playing for that first franchise) eventually broke down a wall of
supremacy in a sport long-dominated by whites within a decade. The breaking of that glassceiling existed in the private sphere. And the continued celebration of that event by Southern
generations that have followed signals that white Southerners of a younger sort were finally
ready to accept a hero outside of their own racial group. 11 John R. Tunis once quipped “Losing is
the great American sin.” For the first time, many white Southerners embraced a black winner in
their midst as their own.
After the record was broken, a local Atlanta reporter (Charlie Roberts) asked Herbert
Aaron (Henry’s father) about the significance of the home run. Mr. Aaron replied with a story
about a fox: “The fox had been running from the dogs all night and finally, as he ran to the top of
the hill and realized he couldn’t get away, he saw the sun coming up. And when he saw that sun,
he just sat down. He looked at the blazing dawn and he said, “I don’t care if they do catch me
now, ’cause I done set the world on fire!”” (Walburn)
2.1

A Brief Chronology
In the Deep South, the traditionally-recognized Reconstruction period lasted from the end

of the Civil War to the Compromise of 1877. During that period black Southerners experienced

11

For a broader and more contemporary context, we could highlight the Election Night Acceptance Speech of
Barack Obama in November of 2008 as a similar cultural event for the nation.
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their greatest political participation under the protection of military forces. Southern states had
numerous black office-holders. Hiram Revels and Blanche Bruce served as United States
Senators from Mississippi. Seventeen black Southerners served in the United States House of
Representatives (Kennedy and Cohen 2013).
Black Southerners sought to acquire as much education as possible to validate their
newfound freedom and status. The Freedman’s Bureau, as well as local and state entities,
provided many of these opportunities from 1865-1900. Historically-Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCUs) took form throughout the South.
A major effort was made to educate black Americans in the “industrial arts”. Especially
formative at the Tuskegee Institute, this movement sprung forth from Booker T. Washington’s
“Atlanta Exposition Speech” in 1895. Many blacks entered this era with high aspirations,
looking to incorporate the Protestant ethic of hard work and economic gain into the story of their
rise.
However, local and state efforts of white supremacy held in-check much of the progress
made after troops returned North. Political, economic, and social gains were also rolled-back by
Redeemers and the Klan in the closing decades of the Nineteenth Century. Reconstruction graft
and corruption was alleged by white leaders, now firmly back in control. Subsequent statutory
disenfranchisement via poll taxes, literacy tests, and the like was justified openly. AfricanAmerican religious organizations, notably the African Methodist-Episcopal Church, began to
serve as the only viable form of organization for many black communities in the South and
throughout the nation.
“Exodusters” comprised a group of several thousand black farm workers who chose to
leave the Deep South for greener pastures in Western and Great Plains states. Their protest was
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rooted in the economic plight of a people mostly resigned to sharecropping or, at best, tenant
farming once federal oversight and support started to wane. Voices (e.g. DuBois and the later
Niagara Movement) dissenting from Washington’s 1895 speech started to demand more strident
legal action to counter the realities facing black America.
Many black Americans were resigned to the realization that the federal government
simply accepted their inferior status, post-1877. Even the national Populist movement, rooted in
labor and farming, turned a blind eye to the plight of the Southern black citizen. Thomas E.
Watson, an ardent populist U.S. Representative from Georgia, sought to unite rural white and
black laborers during the era. However, even he turned a blind eye to his fellow black Georgians
once Bryan was defeated in the Election of 1896.
Perhaps most consequential, given the long view and the crux of this overall study, is the
case of public accommodations. Racial segregation was (and is) the cauldron in which irrational
prejudice is brewed. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was passed to outlaw legal segregation.
However, it was declared unconstitutional in 1883 and was further put to rest in the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Equal access to vital services such as education was thus denied.
Frederick Douglass perhaps described the early status of racism in this era most clearly:
“The color line meets [the Negro] everywhere, … [and leaves him] a rejected man.” (Douglass
1883) That rejection is the succinct takeaway.
Despite these difficulties, black Southerners started to form associations in more diverse
arenas than the church in the early twentieth century. HBCU fraternities and sororities such as
Omega Psi Phi and Alpha Kappa Alpha emerged while the National Negro Business League
promoted black-owned businesses and civic involvement. These efforts were carried out most
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effectively in small clusters but would prove vital as organizational foundations in later decades
(Thorpe 1968).
The Progressive Movement in local, state, and national politics held much of the promise
of earlier populism for these groups. However, persistent racial violence and lingering prejudicial
dogmas in white intellectual circles portended the reality on the ground. Riots abounded
throughout the nation during the presidencies of Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. 12 A separatist
movement (the United Negro Improvement Association) began to form in New York City,
spearheaded by Marcus Garvey. That group’s demise, linked ultimately to Garvey’s conviction
of mail fraud, proved telling of the times. Even when black America sought to distance itself,
obstacles abounded.
Franz Boas lent early academic legitimacy at Columbia University to the notion that the
plight of black Americans was due to persistent prejudice rather than biological imperatives
(Boas 1921). Several of his students, notably Margaret Mead and Zora Neale Hurston, would
later serve as acolytes of this changing narrative. But the host of the contemporary academic
community met those assertions with denial at the time.13 Racial-progressives were generally
put on the constant defensive by further arguments that “Americanism” was clearly “white.”
(Evans 1926) That growing white nationalism, in the wake of a World War and twenty years of
Progressive policies, allowed for the rise of a new Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.
By the Jazz Age and into the 1930s, another new demographic development was taking
shape for black Americans, most consequentially in the South. Decades of revitalizing Southern
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New Orleans and New York City 1900; Springfield, OH 1904; Brownsville, TX, Greensburg, IN, and Atlanta
1906; Springfield, IL 1908; East St. Louis, IL, and Houston 1917; Red “Summer of Hate” 1919 (25 race riots across
several states). Note: The NAACP furthermore estimates the total number of black lynching deaths from 1882-1968
at 4,743 persons. Data Source: “History of Lynchings.” NAACP.org http://www.naacp.org/history-of-lynchings/
(accessed November 1, 2017).
13
Prominent black academics, like Carter G. Woodson, faced even steeper challenges.
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town economies with textile mills and rebuilding urban trade centers had finally bore some
economic fruit (in providing a more diversified job market). Coupled with the first generations of
college-educated black adults, some of whom also brought worldly experience through the Great
War, the culture of black Southerners was no longer confined to the field or the rural church
sanctuary. Although textbooks for American schoolchildren often focus on the Harlem
Renaissance and other revelations of a Great Migration to the North, black culture became
increasingly urban in the South as well.
Working-class black Southerners gained sophistication and economic relevancy in
moving to where jobs existed (e.g. Atlanta, Birmingham, etc.). The social and business
organizations from the turn of the century started to incorporate more than just their elite
counterparts. The advent of higher literacy rates, the automobile, and federally-funded projects to
bring electricity to the rural South all contributed to a rising economic tide for the black South.
By no means were the results on par with the white South, but the achievements leading up to
America’s involvement in World War II were considerable (and built upon the efforts of black
leadership).
To articulate the development of racism as it evolved through these first twentieth
century decades, one must remember the “rejected” black citizen from the end of the nineteenth
century. Regardless of persistent racial violence, segregation, and popular white nationalism (e.g.
Birth of a Nation), the black Southerner of the 1930s was increasingly hard to outright reject. He
was more incorporated into the growth of a modern and industrialized region of the country, with
organized institutions that had survived a lack of support or recognition from white America. He
also was a more constant presence in crowded cities, where legalized discrimination via
segregation was laid bare.

43

Systematic economic exclusion was becoming a harder road to hoe for white
supremacists. At the same time, political exclusion was firmly intact but was facing a changing
landscape on the national level. Northern Democrats sought to court the black vote increasingly
in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, foreboding inter-partisan differences between New
Dealers and Solid South pols. No longer could Southern white Democrats write-off entirely the
strength of a repressed black vote that might not reliably go Republican. Concordantly, Northern
Democrats sensed a voting bloc that was denied access at the booth.
Richard Wright, in Chapter 13 of Black Boy, offers a contemporary account of racism
during that time: “But I could not conquer my sense of guilt, my feeling that the white men
around me knew that I was changing…. My days and nights were one long, quiet, continuously
contained dream of terror, tension, and anxiety. I wondered how long I could bear it.” (Wright
1945) His use of the word contained most definitively describes the aims of the racist institution
then.
War-time production brought Executive Order 8802 and an end to discrimination in
defense-industry jobs in 1941. Coupled with Truman’s desegregation of military units, the
federal government seemed to signal changing times that the Deep South would have to wrestle
with. Certainly, the historic rejection and containment of black interests seemed at-odds with
liberal and democratic ideals on which the war effort rested.
However, Kenneth B. Clark expressed that the general feeling amongst black Americans
was “reality-bound” after the war (Redding 1968, XXV). Politically and economically, there had
been modest gains. Socially and culturally, however, black citizens (especially Southerners) were
resigned to the fact that the underlying attitudes of whites were slow to move. Subsequently, the
realization that there was serious work to do remained. One anecdote passed down through the
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generations during this time (to Southern black children) was the following: “In the North, they
don’t care how high-up you get, as long as you don’t live too close. In the South, they don’t care
how close you live, as long as you don’t get too high-up.” 14
Emboldened by the prospect of further political action, black Americans spear-headed
what is commonly referred to as the “Civil Rights Movement.” 15 The NAACP became
instrumental in prosecuting the pivotal Brown v. Board of Education court case. That classaction suit, filed in 1951, asked that segregation in public schools be formally struck-down. In
the fall of 1955, the first mandated, integrated public school opened. Encouraged by that
decision, high-profile boycotts and sit-ins followed.
The 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, in support of Rosa Parks, added to the public spaces
in which black Americans sought equal access. In 1957, a watershed event at Central High
School in Little Rock, Arkansas brought federal support to the overall cause. The “Little Rock
Nine” were escorted there by National Guard troops ordered in by President Eisenhower.
By 1962, universities such as Ole Miss also began to integrate in the Deep South. The
violence of the Birmingham fire-bombing campaign captured further reaction from President
John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. In endorsing the overall movement, it
was at this point that the prospect of a new Civil Rights Act took material form.
Signed into law by Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1964 (following the assassination of
Kennedy), the bill outlawed any existing legislation that allowed for discrimination. Its ultimate
approval gained traction following the influential March on Washington in August 1963, where
14

Original source unknown, though I have heard this exact phrase in numerous conversations with black colleagues
through the years.
15
For the purposes of my scientific inquiry, I find it problematic to use this term regularly. Civil Rights, in general,
have been extended or restricted throughout American history. Furthermore, any serious discussion about the racial
element therein must acknowledge the whole of historical movements, rather than selected pieces. I do not offer a
“better” term here. I can only offer that the coining of the phrase and its regular usage tends to elevate the events of
the 1950s and 1960s, potentially at the detriment to an analysis of what came before.
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Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. enunciated his “Dream.” Johnson described the signing of the bill as
such: “Yet millions are deprived of those blessings (of liberty) …. because of the color of their
skin …. but it cannot continue. Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. The
principles of our freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign tonight forbids
it.”16
In late 1964, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference selected Selma, Alabama as
the focal point for their fight towards ending voting suppression. That city was home of the white
Alabama Citizens’ Council, an organization created to combat the effects of the new Civil Rights
Act. Early efforts there gained international attention in the form of the Nobel Peace Prize to
King. Furthermore, in 1965, three separate marches were met with violent attacks by local law
enforcement. Camera footage spread throughout the United States and the world, bringing voting
rights to the forefront of the national discussion.
Formally, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ended statutory prejudice in the nation’s voting
systems. Immediately, blacks began voting and running for public office in numbers not seen
since the Compromise of 1877. However, just days after the signing, a violent riot in the Watts
neighborhood of Los Angeles resulted in thirty-four deaths. That event served as a testament to
the racial violence that persisted on the street, regardless of progressive political achievements.
Racially-motivated violent crimes continued through the middle of the twentieth century.
Although lynching had been occurring at an alarming rate for decades, high-profile incidents
gained increased national attention due to the advent of television news as well as higher overall
literacy rates post-World War II. The case of Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old who was
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Source: “Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” LOC.gov https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civilrights-act/multimedia/johnson-signing-remarks.html (accessed July 17, 2017).
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murdered in 1955, shocked many around the country. Emmett’s mother, Mamie Bradley,
demanded that an open-casket funeral be held to show the effects of the hate crime to the nation.
The social “caste system” in the Deep South furthermore brought danger to white Americans
seeking to combat it. During the “Freedom Summer” campaign of 1964, two white Northerners
and a black Southerner were murdered outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi for their efforts in
registering voters.17
“Black Power,” a philosophical response to the pacifist leanings of the SCLC, added
further dimension to the era. As eventual Chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee (succeeding John Lewis), Stokely Carmichael evolved to espouse the construct of
Black Power most clearly. He stated that freedom (as granted by new legislation) was never truly
a victory. Rather, freedom was a birthright that needed to be achieved in society, where power
dynamics did not always adhere to the principles of written law. Thus, oftentimes, that power
would need to be taken instead of only received. Earlier, in March of 1960, an advertisement
bought by Atlanta HBCU leaders in the Constitution, Journal, and Daily World foretold this new
message: “We do not intend to wait placidly for those rights which are already legally and
morally ours to be meted out to us one at a time.” (Sitkoff, 71)
The Black Panther Party carried that message further. Selling Mao’s “Little Red Book” to
students at U.C. Berkeley, the group began funding the purchase of military-style uniforms and
firearms in 1966. The aim was to combat social ills such as hunger in black communities but to
do so actively and through a show of unified force. The group’s forthright rhetoric and
ideological linkage to Malcolm X led to distinct fear across white America, leading F.B.I.
Director J. Edgar Hoover to target the organization aggressively.

17

Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney were the victims. Popular culture eulogized the trio in
several songs during the subsequent Cultural Revolution that lasted into the early 1970s.
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Towards the end of this time period, the high-profile assassinations of leaders like King
and Malcolm X served as a bitter denouement. In retrospect, it appears that these people and
events “fast-tracked” the American nation on a course towards dealing with racism in the public
sphere. No longer could black Americans be “rejected” or “contained” legally. A holistic
investigation into the meaning of that era leaves us with several more unanswered questions,
though. Was it simply the culmination of decades of slow movement? Did the psychological
shock of World War II provide a catalyst for a rapid increase in tolerance and equality? Were the
policy remedies effective in dealing with systemic racism? Did the movement “end?”
I must defer historical judgment on the first couple questions and let historians argue the
merits of their conclusions. Anecdotal evidence in race relations can point to successes and
failures in the years since. However, it does remain vital that I explain my answers to the last two
in order to achieve my ends.
2.2

Were the policy remedies effective? Did the movement “end?”
Firstly, the efficacy of policy changes is relative. In judging whether or not the institution

of racism was fundamentally changed, my theory clearly states that it was. However, I reserve
judgment as to how effective reams of policy have been alone. I am more interested in how the
discriminatory acts and prejudicial thoughts of white Southerners have been altered in the
aftermath. After this long “Reconstruction,” racism has been described in a multitude of new
ways. I contend that the most accurate descriptions hinge on observing the system through a
local lens. Chester Devillers commented on his own community of Darien, Georgia at the end of
his political career in 1989:
“There are still too many bigots and racists among both black and
white. It has gotten somewhat better, but we still haven’t arrived.
We have a long way to go. Some people feel we should have never
integrated, that we should have worked on making things equal.
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We were separate, but we never would have been equal. There are
people here today who are not totally pleased with integration, and
I guess they never will be. But if they can just leave the young
children alone, integration will do some good. My philosophy has
been in order for me to get the same food, I have to sit at the same
table.” (Greene, 335)
Fundamentally, I do glean optimism from the changes I describe in my theory.
Furthermore, I will seek to provide evidence in the following Chapters that reveals weaknesses
in the pillars of systemic racism. Most directly, I would argue that desegregation of public
schools (specifically) has proven to be the most consequential process in the path-dependent
“Reconstruction” of the South and its racism. The fruits of that process have led to more equalstatus intergroup contacts than any other.
What we should be able to find evidence for is that the individual-level behaviors and
attitudes of white Southerners who have been educated in integrated classrooms have since
become divergent. In assessing the simple theoretical models that I put forth, it is clear that I
view the removal of legal pillars as a primary source of the shift. The fact that racism still
remains, however, reveals that it simply has evolved once again.
This question is a bit rhetorical in nature, as I have described civil rights as organic and
variable. Underlying the answer I give is the fact that I argue that something did necessarily
change by the early 1970s. The defining moment in our nation’s cultural history that I provided
at the outset of this Chapter can (and should) be investigated. I am certain that countless other
events might imbue a sense of racial “achievement” or “harmony” for other Americans.
The process of furthering intergroup contact has occurred over decades in the Deep
South. Fundamentally changing white Southerners’ actions and thoughts has never been an easy
proposition, even with the advent of integrated schools and increasingly-diverse neighborhoods.
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I cannot state that my theory was birthed on April 8, 1974, but the import of young white
Southerners embracing an iconic black Southerner exists in that event.
The movement towards more equal civil rights will ever reach a conclusion, but I do
think we can point to a moment in our history when it became evident that white and black
Southerners were finally able to acknowledge each other’s existence and (perhaps) work towards
a relationship of non-zero-sum engagements with one another. The movement did not end but
the specific character of racism that pre-dated it did.
This statement is perhaps the most controversial to make at the conclusion of a timeline
on the development of systemic racism. And perhaps it is the hardest to definitively prove, as
most assumptions in political science are. Beyond the richness of the cultural context, I can only
point to what the data reveals as a counterpoint to the host of assertions otherwise. And, in a
hopeful sense, if we can assume that the character of racism has changed in a specific arena, then
we can also alter our strategies in the continuance of a movement towards increased civil
equality.
3

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS UPDATE VIA NATIONAL SURVEY DATA

“Outside of the metropolitan areas, integration of the public school systems is complete
because of the historic intermixing of white and black homes…. On farms and in small
towns there has always been a close and personal relationship between individual black
and white citizens, even when the strictest legal segregation was observed in public
facilities and at social functions. After de jure segregation ended, there was no need to
walk across the street and say, “I would like to introduce myself. I’m your white neighbor
who has lived here for the last forty years.”
Jimmy Carter, Why Not The Best?
Glaser (1994) concludes that Key’s (1949) threat hypothesis still holds up to empirical
study. But little research has been accomplished in recent decades to replicate or update these
findings. Taylor (1998) finds less evidence for “threat” than Glaser; however, the data she
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employs is limited to samples from metropolitan areas alone (mostly outside the South). In the
quote above, former President Carter presents the reality of growing up in the Deep South and
the impact of the end of segregation on those that lived through it. It is that reality that I seek to
investigate in the modern context.
A band of black belt counties still votes Democrat in local, state, and national elections.
This Democratic support varies from county to county, but it is consistent with high percentages
of black residents in black belt areas that closely follow a line of traditional cotton production
from South Carolina to Louisiana. It is not clear whether this phenomenon is due to attitudinal or
economic prerogatives.
Carmines and Stimson (1981, 1984, 1986, 1989) contend that Southern partisan
realignment has evolved from shifting racial attitudes. Yet Voss (1996) finds anecdotal evidence
in Louisiana that realignment is not necessarily caused by “threat.” Black (2004) argues that the
Democratic Party is now the party of racial inclusion, asserting that prejudicial white voters
would be less-inclined to vote for Democrats. All conclude that race informs electoral behaviors.
Explaining the blue counties amongst the red appears simple; one should simply identify
the black belt counties with the highest proportions of black residents (a Democratic voting
bloc). However, this assumption offers no empirical explanation for the voting behavior of
contemporary black belt whites (nor does it juxtapose that behavior with racial attitudes).
Logically, it appears highly unlikely that racially conservative white Democrats still exist in
these regions as their interests would not rationally align with that of the modern party. Whether
or not prejudice itself is more prevalent in the black belt than elsewhere is also uncertain.
While the development of competing theories of threat and contact is substantial, current
empirical study on racial attitudes and political behavior across the Southern landscape offers no
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easy answers in assessing change over time. On the one hand, threat suggests that racial conflict
leads to political realities. On the other hand, contact suggests that political preferences that
contribute to systemic racism may be mitigated by interracial interaction.
Reconciling both of these models in the present requires a more detailed look into what
occurs within and between areas that differ in racial composition and context. Much of Key’s
(1949) “backbone of the Old South” remains demographically intact within the black belt. To
assess whether or not phenomena of voting behaviors requires a new understanding of race
relations in the South, the attitudes and behaviors of modern Southern whites must be explored.
In accordance with the theory that equal-status contact has had a mitigating impact on
prejudice in the Deep South, I test three specific predictions that directly challenge group threat
regarding racial attitudes.
H1A: Rates of white prejudice are not higher in the Deep
South than outside the Deep South.
H2A: Higher black populations have a greater effect on
lessening white prejudice in the Deep South than in the non-Deep
South.
H3A: In the Deep South, rates of white prejudice are lower
in areas of higher black populations than in areas of lower black
populations.
Individual-level data from the Racial Attitudes in America Survey (Pew Research Center
for the People and the Press 2007) is the primary source for analysis. This survey includes
questions relating to (but not limited to) race, racial attitudes, age, gender, income, and education
level. Quite fortunately, this survey data also includes zip codes for all respondents that are
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typically missing from most other contemporary national surveys. Additionally, I use 2010
United States Census data in linking populations and the percentages of black residents in the
“Deep South” as well as the rest of the nation.
The analysis is to be divided into three sections. First, I describe the data and methods
utilized for testing. Secondly, I present the estimation and results. Lastly, I conclude with a
discussion on the implications of the findings.
3.1

Data and Methods
Individual-level data from the Racial Attitudes in America Survey (Pew Research Center

for the People and the Press 2007) is the primary source for analysis. 18 This survey includes
questions relating to (but not limited to) race, racial attitudes, age, gender, income, and education
level. Quite fortunately, this survey data also includes zip codes for all respondents that are
typically missing from most other contemporary national surveys. Additionally, I use 2010
United States Census data in linking populations and the percentages of black residents in the
“Deep South” 19 as well as the rest of the nation. Only respondents identifying themselves as
white have been included.
3.2

Dependent Variable
Operationalizing prejudice is perhaps the most limiting aspect of this empirical study. To

put it bluntly, there are countless competing measures that exist within the literature. This Pew
survey has been chosen very carefully because it allows a more detailed consideration of
geographic determinants while also focusing questions on racial issues. The opportunity does

18

Several variables include observations of “no response.” Thus, the number of observations within each may vary
slightly.
19
Whereas Glaser (1994) also includes a comparative analysis of the “Outer South”, I have chosen to focus solely
on the Deep South in order to describe the modern electoral phenomena of the black belt within the context of Key’s
(1949) “threat” (see also Valentino and Sears 2005 for further justification).
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exist to co-opt a previously-used method of measuring prejudice (e.g. symbolic racism scale)
using any one of a host of other surveys (e.g. ANES), but (to my knowledge) these simply do not
satisfy the requirements for my specific topic because of the lack of contextual variables
contained within (e.g. zip code).
Ultimately, I have selected a “toughest test” to code for Explicit White Prejudice using
the Pew survey. Because of the considerable debate as to how to appropriately measure prejudice
(e.g. symbolic racism), I do think it necessary to describe the steps I undertook to address the
potential bias inherent in my ultimate choice of a dependent variable. Due to the nature of the
survey questions, combining elements of both traditional prejudice and symbolic racism
appeared to be prudent at the outset (there was no comprehensive battery in the Pew survey that
was directly derived from a previously-used method). Using Taylor’s (1998) subscales for
traditional anti-black prejudice, I first coded “aversion to contact with blacks” as well as “antiegalitarianism” using questions that proxied for these sentiments. Furthermore, using Henry and
Sears’ (2002) Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale, I also accounted for “excessive demands” of blacks
(256) and “undeserved advantage” of blacks (256). Five questions were ultimately selected from
the survey, and responses were rescaled from 0 to 1 (for simplicity alone) so that higher scores
indicate increased probabilities of prejudice and lower scores indicated decreased probabilities of
prejudice. The mean prejudice scores across all questions indexed for relative white prejudice at
the individual level. I then utilized factor analysis to evaluate the statistical value of this index
for my study. Ultimately, though, the result yielded little usefulness. The questions did not
converge on an acceptable level to assume some latent “prejudice” was evidenced therein. If I
was to persist in lumping together these questions, I could not in good conscience justify the
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theoretical and methodological bases on which they rested. In the end, I have opted for a simpler
(yet wholly justifiable) course of action.
One particular “thermometer” question asked respondents to rate their feelings towards
blacks along a 4-point Likert scale. 20 There are inherent problems with coding these responses
with no alteration. First, it is highly unlikely that the substantive difference between responses is
equidistant (it may take much more for someone to move from “favorable” to “unfavorable” than
from “very” to “mostly”). Secondly, social desirability bias is of great concern with such a
limited number of options (limiting my ability to uncover nuance as well as implicit feelings). 21
Therefore, the only inherent prejudice or racism that I can confidently proxy from this question
alone is whether a white respondent indicated either a “mostly” or “very” unfavorable feeling
towards blacks.
Since discounting variation of responses is atypical, I argue that it is most prudent in this
specific case because all of the suitable alternatives have been properly vetted and I cannot
account for social desirability bias in keeping with the ordinal scale as-is. What I can do,
however, is positively identify where animus exists by reduction. This strategy entails avoiding
the pitfalls of justifying the prominence of the aforementioned subscales (over other choices)
while simplifying the proxy. In the end, respondents simply said what they meant.
Dixon (2006) actually argues that this kind of simple method is superior. If a respondent
is clear enough in his or her intentions to register an “unfavorable” feeling, then the prejudice is
explicit and undeniable. This variable, a dichotomous coding of Explicit White Prejudice, offers
the best iron-clad testing opportunity from the Pew survey. Certainly, there may be bias in the

20
21

Very favorable, Mostly favorable, Mostly unfavorable, Very unfavorable
While many opted for a “No response”, a vast majority did fortunately answer along the scale.
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underreporting of prejudice in general, but there can be no argument as to what the respondents
who answered “unfavorable” felt.
3.3

Independent Variables
Census data from 2010 is used to code for the percentage of black residents (Percentage

Black) in the zip code for all respondents (included those outside of the Deep South) 22. This
variable proxies for racial context in that it directly correlates to the probability of contact with
and/or threat from people of color. Additionally, I have coded the percentage of black residents
in the nearest municipality and county of residence for Deep South respondents (this was also
accomplished using Census data combined with map studies). I have chosen to test for all three
of these different geographic areas to more fully depict the effects of racial composition on white
racism (Baybeck 2006). Although zip code demographics are the most specific of these
measures, cities and counties provide additional units in accounting for threat (through differing
levels of contact) within a community. Including these levels may yield greater insight.
Percentage Black is the primary variable of interest due to the considerable work that has
been done to equate racial threat with high levels of contact. Logic would have it that higher
percentage of black residents that live in a particular area would equate to higher levels of
contact with those black residents. Additionally, since this study is focused on particular areas
with high levels of black populations, it is paramount to utilize such a contextual variable.
Consistent with other work in the racial attitudes literature, Age, Gender (0 = Male, 1 =
Female), Income, and Education Level serve as “individual-level predictors” (Taylor, 519) for
estimating white racism. In large part, the inclusion of these variables accounts for much nesting
within the dataset. The income and education values within the dataset originate as ordinal data

22

In whole, 1932 separate data observations were matched and coded in addition to the original data.
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that indicates direction (as opposed to specific substantive values). Taylor argues that
generational differences, gender gaps, income factors, and learning all contribute heavily towards
different levels of prejudice in a host of studies. We should anticipate that younger generations,
females, and well-educated respondents would exhibit lower levels on average. However, the
data on income level is generally mixed.
The natural log of Population for zip code, nearest municipality, and county of residence
serves as a “locality-level predictor” (Taylor 1998, 519) in estimating white racism. I expect an
inherent difference in attitudes based upon urban and rural settings. Self-selection may play a
role in where one lives. By including this variable, I attempt to more accurately explain the
realities within black belt and non-black belt locales.
3.4

Testing
Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use maximum likelihood

estimation to assess impact of Percentage Black on Explicit White Prejudice in the Deep South
and outside the Deep South. I have included three geographic levels for modeling the Deep
South. Initial descriptive statistics confirm that observations of Explicit White Prejudice are
much rarer than otherwise (less than 20%). Thus, I estimate a firthlogit model to mitigate bias
from rare events (Firth 1993).23 I also use a simple difference of proportions t-test to compare
Explicit White Prejudice in the Deep South with elsewhere.

23

Although other options exist for rare events modeling (exact logistic regression, relogit (King and Zeng 2001),
scobit), penalized MLE via firthlogit consistently exhibits the least bias upon Monte Carlo simulation (Leitgoeb
2013).
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3.5

Analyses
Below, I present the results of my analyses. Although they address the hypotheses

somewhat “out of order”, the presentation should nonetheless make sense as I begin
broadly and narrow the focus throughout.
Table 3.5.1 Summary Statistics and Difference of Proportions t-test for Explicit White Prejudice
Within and Outside the Deep South

Proportions of Explicit White Prejudice
N
p-value

Deep South
.098
143

Non-Deep South
.089
1302
.726

Table 3.5.1 presents the simple results of the t-test. I juxtapose the proportions of Explicit
White Prejudice for both Deep South and non-Deep South respondents. Subsequently, there is no
statistical evidence with which to reject the null hypothesis for 𝐻 . Substantively, the data
suggest that observed processes affecting racism may not actually differ much within and outside
of the Deep South. The preponderance of political science research in this area suggests
otherwise, of course, and so this singular finding must be taken in stride.
In Table 3.5.2, I contrast demographic determinants of contact (and thus potential threat)
for the most-specific geographic variable available (zip code). In doing so, I seek to address
whether or not there is a significant difference between the Deep South and elsewhere in this
conception. The resulting estimation yields a striking difference. For one, the sign for Percentage
Black differs in each. Additionally, there is evidence enough to suggest that, while close contact
does perhaps moderate Deep South prejudice, it does so in the opposite direction of that which is
typically expected (more on this later). There is evidence enough here to reject the null
hypothesis for 𝐻 , but this fact obviously does not square with the prediction of the opposing
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hypothesis. In fact, there is statistical evidence to suggest that a countervailing hypothesis should
be investigated.
Table 3.5.2 Estimates of Explicit White Prejudice as a Function of Black Population Percentage
in Zip Code (Deep South and Non-Deep South)
Region
Variable
Percentage Black

Deep South
p-value
Non-Deep South
p-value
-3.884
.112
.698
.310
(.687)
(2.446)
Age
.001
.957
-.008
.226
(.006)
(.019)
Gender
-1.517
.027
-.369
.091
(.218)
(.688)
Income
-.136
.383
-.059
.276
(.054)
(.156)
Education
-.001
.995
-.150
.037
(.072)
(.212)
Population (ln)
.051
.885
.133
.218
(.108)
(.353)
N
120
1055
6.77
15.87
𝜒
Log Likelihood
-21.863
-296.543
Note: Parameters estimated via firthlogit. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
Statistical significance reflects a two-tailed test. Log Likelihood is penalized.

I estimate three concurrent models in Table 3.5.3 to account for any variation in results
that might accompany testing for different population areas. The directional sign is consistent
across all measures, though it is in the opposite direction of what would be expected. With over
88% confidence, I estimate that higher percentages of black residents in zip code have a
significant negative effect on white racism in the Deep South. The more diffuse regions of
municipality and county offer lessening statistical support for that conclusion, but that really all
makes substantive sense. White respondents should be most-affected by a “close” demography
while experiencing a weakening effect as the (real) distances between individuals in an area
increase.
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Table 3.5.3 Estimates of Explicit White Prejudice as a Function of Multilevel Black Population
Percentages (Deep South)
Population Areas
Variable
Percentage Black
(expected sign +)

Zip Code

p-value

Municipality

p-value

County

pvalue
.743

-3.88
(2.446)

.112

-2.628
(1.877)

.162

-.585
(1.786)

Age

.001
(.019)

.957

-.003
(.019)

.875

-.001
(.019)

.972

Gender

-1.517
(.688)

.027

-1.447
(.668)

.030

-1.393
(.659)

.034

Income

-.136
(.156)

.383

-.135
(.152)

.375

-.104
(.149)

.484

Education

-.001
(.212)

.995

.054
(.205)

.792

-.011
(.187)

.955

Population (ln)

.051
.885
-.092
.592
.086
.754
(.353)
(.172)
(.275)
N
120
121
121
6.77
7.45
4.88
𝜒
Log Likelihood
-21.863
-21.572
-23.975
Note: Parameters estimated via firthlogit. The numbers in parentheses are the standard
errors. Statistical significance reflects a two-tailed test. Log Likelihood is penalized.

I balk at rejecting the null hypothesis for 𝐻

outright. However, the findings here are

highly intriguing, especially given the black belt electoral phenomenon cited in Figure 1.1.1.
Notwithstanding the clear lack of support for status quo hypotheses across the board, I find an
opportunity for new direction within the limited analyses here. These are more than null or
disconfirming findings. At the very least, the presence of significant racial “threat” in attitude
formation (as specified by Key) appears to be disputed. Key’s arguments, as applied to white
supremacist behavioral choices, are not the topic here. Rather, in presenting the evidence as I
have, I assert that prejudicial attitudes are not necessarily formed most prevalently in
geographical areas with great racial heterogeneity.
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Note: Brackets are 95% C.I.

Figure 3.5.1 Predicted Probabilities of Explicit White Prejudice in the Deep South
Lastly, a close look at Figure 3.5.1 provides perhaps the greatest jumping-off point. As
black population percentages increase from one interval to the next, it is clear that the likelihood
of white racism declines at each step. Even more intriguing is the shifting magnitude evident in
the predicted probabilities. The relationship is not linear for this “counter-threat”. Instead, it
appears to be mediated by other significant factors as part of a process that is distinctly
moderated by the size of out-groups in close proximity. The greatest volatility, it seems, appears
to be at lower levels of black populations. However, it is also important to note that relative
likelihoods of increased prejudice (values above zero) stay virtually constant throughout.
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3.6

Discussion
The sum total of the analyses yields considerable support for the three hypotheses at the

outset of the Chapter. Though statistical significance does not yield necessarily to a smoking-gun
of change, the substantive significance of these findings rests with the fact that they are
contradictory to a host of previous studies.
Not only do the results seem to imply that there is little difference in overall levels of
prejudice within and outside of the Deep South, but they also illustrate that the process of contact
leads to differences in racial attitudes depending on where one resides. The “diminishing returns”
of contact given larger contexts of contact (zip code – municipality – county) is likewise
intuitively powerful. At more intimate levels of relative closeness, the effects on whether one
exhibits animus are more extreme.
Though these analyses fall short of a comprehensive test of my theory, they do provide
valuable support and insight for further testing of additional hypotheses. To advance the theory, I
need to be able to carefully replicate and expand upon these results while also articulating how
discrimination ties into the overall system of racism in the modern Deep South.
I argue that it is critical to understand the barriers towards doing so. For one, the topic of
racism is (in and of itself) emotionally- and ideologically-charged. Even for the most
professional of social scientists, there are normative considerations that simply cannot be
brushed aside easily. And, partially because of those normative considerations, any new or
innovative efforts in addressing the topic may be met with a professional scrutiny that can be
insurmountable from the outset. Particularly in the case of this study, focused on white racial
attitudes in the cradle of historic white supremacy, the die has been cast for many who have
preceded in these efforts.
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Thus, significant steps must be made in unraveling the several threads of contradictory
findings in this Chapter alone. Subsequently, I attempt to more appropriately model a new
understanding of Deep South threat in Chapter 4. Objectively critiquing the current scholarship, I
concede that useful data has been simply hard to come by. Therefore, I present evidence from an
original study that has been designed specifically to address the theoretical and methodological
controversies that remain from this present effort.
4

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS UPDATE VIA ORIGINAL SURVEY EXPERIMENT
“Once the realization is accepted that even between the closest human beings infinite
distances continue, a wonderful living side by side can grow, if they succeed in loving the
distance between them which makes it possible for each to see the other whole against
the sky.”
Rainer Maria Rilke, Letters to a Young Poet
I contend that modeling racism as a system provides the best option in evaluating how

racialized politics may be explained. By examining the political phenomena that evolve
following the “injection” of race, political scientists may seek to understand how and why racial
groups seek to maximize political utility in a variety of environments. As the political landscape
changes alongside racial context, political scientists may more accurately evaluate political
realities given that modeling. Only in accepting these realities may progress amongst races that
live in close proximity be achieved.
Analyzing the role of race in individual-level Southern Politics must likewise begin with
an acknowledgment of the undergirding supports of racism. Rather than assuming a causal
mechanism whereby racism simply leads to phenomena in and of itself, I begin the discussion of
causality by addressing process.
Individuals are not simply “racist” within the context of certain systemic environments.
That reasoning is, of course, an ecological fallacy. Rather, the unequal promotion of goals is a
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hallmark of behavior that supports an unequal system. Likewise, individual-level mechanisms
that promote the development of irrational prejudice are another support. Scholarship suggests
that we may posit that the advent of legal and social changes in the American South have
allowed for the possibility of prejudicial or discriminatory changes. But, that possibility hinges
on an evaluation of those very supports of systemic racism.
In order to address the limitations of the Pew survey data (specifically related to
measuring attitudes), as well as to distinguish between attitudes (prejudice) and behaviors
(discrimination) regarding race, I test two specific predictions. Using an original survey and
experiment designed to assess contextual demographic effects, I specifically target white racial
attitudes and behaviors within the Deep South. Prejudice is assessed via a battery of feeling
thermometer questions24, while discrimination is assessed via a dictator game experiment. The
two hypotheses are:
H4A: In the Deep South, rates of white prejudice are lower
in areas of higher black populations than in areas of lower black
populations.
H5A: In the Deep South, rates of white discrimination are
higher in areas of higher black populations than in areas of lower
black populations.
These two predictions serve to highlight the paradox put forth within my theoretical
section: Deep South whites exhibit seemingly implausible racially-pluralistic attitudes and
racially-protectionist behaviors at the same time. Racial demography, serving as the primary
contextual variable via contact as well as threat, is purported as the catalyst for such divergence.

24

Precisely the same as Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) and Dixon (2006).
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To test for my contention that individual-level competition also may trump racial grouplevel competition as a curious by-product, I offer one additional hypothesis test:
H6A: In the Deep South, rates of white discrimination
towards blacks are not distinguishable from rates of white
discrimination towards other whites.
It is critical to understand that discrimination, as narrowly-measured by this dictator
game experiment, begins with individuals possessing some level of utility at the outset. This
precondition, as I see it, squares with systemic inequality via institutionalized racism. Thus, on
face value, external validity should not be so problematic so as to not present the results of such
a test.
The analysis is to be divided into three sections. First, I describe the data and methods
utilized for testing. Secondly, I present the estimation and results. Lastly, I conclude with a
discussion on the implications of the findings. The Research Design and Survey Instrument are
detailed in the Appendix.
4.1

Data and Methods
Individual-level data was compiled from an original electronic survey experiment

conducted from February to April of 2016 at a large, public university in Atlanta, Georgia.
University students voluntarily participated in an undergraduate survey pool, in which they were
able to choose from a variety of research projects to participate in. The total number of
participants was 407.25

25

Several variables include observations of “no response”. Thus, the number of observations within each estimation
varies.
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The specific title of the project was “Prejudice and Discrimination: A Dictator Game
Experiment.” The survey included questions relating to (but not limited to) race, racial attitudes,
age, gender, income, political opinions and ideology, and demographic determinants.
Participants could access the survey and experiment via mobile device or desktop computer at
any time of day during the run. Given the specific focus on white attitudes and behaviors, usable
responses from the highly-diverse pool of participants were actually limited to 91 upon final
coding.26 This limitation was anticipated; the final number was adequate and appropriate for the
methods utilized.
Although external validity is often questioned when it comes to analyses of student
populations, the recent broad usage of such pools in political science research has yielded a
substantial defense for this form of data collection. Kam (2011) argues that undergraduate
student populations substantively may not differ from the wider population. She offers only two
situations in which this actually affects the legitimacy of an experimental research design: 1)
when there is a heterogeneous causal effect not modeled for; and 2) the students differ from the
“target population” with reference to the moderating variable of interest. Bornstein (1999)
provides earlier experimental evidence for the same.
A key component of the structure of the survey instrument was to “drill-down” into an
array of specific items that are typically missing or not present together in national surveys. For
instance, respondents’ home zip codes and high schools of attendance were gathered in addition
to respondents’ perceptions of the racial makeups of the same. Baybeck (2006) asserts that using
different hierarchical levels as well as measures of perception is the logical next step towards

26

The institutional IRB mandated that, while minority students could gain access to the survey experiment at the
outset, a “kick-out” mechanism needed to be put in place in order to only gather data that would be actually be used
(e.g. that from self-identified “white” respondents). Also, all coding steps have been documented and are available
upon request.
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providing valid tests on racial context. The addition of the school environment is the most
original innovation, of particular importance to my theoretical development.
The specific questions asked during the survey experiment were: a) What is the zip code
of your hometown?; b) To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the population
percentages of the following racial groups in your home community: (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic
or Latino (Non-White); c) What high school did you graduate from?; and d) To the best of your
knowledge, please estimate the amount of personal contact you had with members of the
following racial groups in your home community (including your educational environment):
(Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White).
Post-survey experiment, I used 2010 United States Census data in linking those zip code
populations and the percentages of black residents residing in each. For high school data, I cross
-referenced each individual school with the latest State Board of Education statistics at the time
of the study (December 2016 updates).27 Due to the nature of the project, only respondents
originally from the “Deep South” 28 were included in analyses. The specific juxtaposition of
racial contexts within this defined area provides the clearest test on whether contact is, indeed,
consequential (and whether post-integration realities differ). This very specific choice is not
simply intended to offer a critique of Key. That extensive work is a foundation of understanding
as well as an enlightening window into the South of his time. However, as I noted in Chapter 2,
the American institution of racism has undergone several changes in the eighty or so odd years
since.

27

Data Sources: SCHOOLGRADES.GA.GOV; WEB.ALSDE.EDU; ED.SC.GOV; HIGH-SCHOOLS.COM
(Private Schools)
28
Whereas Glaser (1994) also includes a comparative analysis of the “Outer South”, I have chosen to focus solely
on the Deep South in order to describe the modern electoral phenomena of the black belt within the context of Key’s
(1949) “threat” (see also Valentino and Sears 2005 for further justification).
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No other studies of which I am aware combine a focus on white attitudes and behaviors
in the Deep South with updated methods for defining racial context, prejudice, and
discrimination.
4.2

Dependent Variables
One of the most exciting aspects of this study is the pairing of fairly recently-developed

operationalizing methods for prejudice and discrimination with the aforementioned demographic
data. Referenced previously, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) and Dixon (2006) advocate a simple
additive index that captures the relative distance between how whites perceive themselves in
relation to other racial groups on three dimensions of traditional stereotyping.
This strategy combats social desirability bias by using a series of questions not targeting
any specific prejudice towards any specific group. Instead, it provides a “feeling thermometer”
on members of the racial out-group in relation to the respondent’s feelings about his or her racial
in-group. The questions used address attitudes on intelligence, commitment to working hard, and
commitment to family values. These three specific domains have consistently been cited by the
racial attitudes literature as hallmarks of historical stereotyping (Dixon 2006).
The specific questions asked during the survey experiment were: a) Where would you
rate (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)) in general on this scale? (Intelligent to
Unintelligent); b) Where would you rate (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)) in
general on this scale? (Hard-working to Lazy); and c) Where would you rate (Whites, Blacks,
Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)) in general on this scale? (Very committed to strong families to
Lacking a commitment to strong families).
After data collection via a 7-point Likert Scale, I have coded for White Prejudice by
simply gathering the positive cumulative scores for white respondents’ attitudes of their in-group
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in relation to their black counterparts. In this conception, a higher score indicates higher levels of
White Prejudice.29
The operationalizing of White Discrimination is likewise paramount. While clear
evidence of discrimination may be gathered in aggregate data and descriptive statistics, standalone surveys used for the purpose of investigating individual-level data are severely limited. A
researcher may seek responses directed towards past behavior or even hypothetical situations,
but pure behavioral data is best-attained through experimental research (Druckman et al. 2011).
A dictator game experiment was utilized at the conclusion of the survey that placed an
economic decision squarely in the hands of the respondent. They were informed that they had
been “awarded” ten raffle tickets for their participation that could be kept or donated to a
“research assistant:”
“Thank you for taking part in this survey. As a token of
gratitude, you have been given ten raffle tickets assigned to your
survey ID. You may choose to keep any number of the raffle
tickets for yourself, or you may choose to donate any number to a
Political Science research assistant. How many raffle tickets would
you like to donate to my research assistant (Derek) on the left? 30
The placement of such privilege in the hands of the white
respondents was specifically designed to mimic historic racial
economic inequalities.”

29

More-positive judgments were assigned a value closer to “1” while more-negative judgments were assigned a
value closer to “7”.
30
In the actual instrument, the pictures were placed to the left of the text.
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Figure 4.2.1 The Two Research Assistants (Randomized Treatments)
Photo Source: Stock Photos accessed via GOOGLE.COM.

There may be something about the process of treating that biases the effects of the causal
mechanism (e.g. Hawthorne Effects). A major part of countering this problem is in developing
procedures that anticipate how subjects will interpret the treatment. In order to ensure a low
likelihood of testing effects, the researcher should be careful not to give “too much” information
about what the experiment is all about. In layman’s terms, the procedures of the experiment
should “hide” the fact that subjects are being observed relative to a particular effect. Although no
prize or award was clearly mentioned, the onus was on the holder to either keep his or her
economic advantage or (as the key alternative) to donate a portion of their newfound personal
utility to the assistant. See Figure 4.2.1 for a depiction of the two fictitious research assistants,
both referred to as “Derek” in the experiment. The treatment was randomized to only expose the
subject to either one photo or the other.
Background, clothing, and facial expressions were kept consistent for each treatment.
Additionally, recent research suggests the name (and spelling of) “Derek” does not conform to
broad racial or ethnic expectations (Tzioumis 2018). According to Holbrook, Fessler, and
Navarette (2016), that specific inclusion of a name could prove problematic if not given adequate
forethought. Recent advancements in graphic design capabilities have made it possible to alter
the “race” of such treatments using the same standard face (Iyengar et al. 2013). However, I
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judged that the products of such manipulation often exhibit artificialities. In the end, I opted for
presenting the donation decision as more personal (i.e. named) and visually realistic.
Although the lurking variable of altruism might contribute to higher or lower donations in
general, the beauty of the experimental method is to essentially negate the effects of such via
randomization. What remains is a simple measure of how much each subject was willing to give,
thus allowing an insight into any White Discrimination that might be evidenced. Essentially,
White Discrimination is reduced to the amount of tickets donated, logically affected only by the
racially-based randomized treatments within the statistical models ultimately presented.
4.3

Independent Variables
The most consequential variable for development here is that of Racial Context. To

reiterate, Census data from 2010 is used to code for the percentage of black residents in the home
zip code for all respondents. Additionally, I have coded the percentage of black students in the
high schools of attendance using the most recent public data available from the time of the study.
The perception of each respondent on the racial makeup of these differing localities has also
been collected, using open-ended percentage-based estimates for zip codes and contact-level
estimates via a 7-Point Likert Scale for schooling environment.
While I have replicated the relative power of the zip code variable in this instance (shown
in the modeling in Chapter 331), I have also chosen to incorporate the educational setting as it is a
foundation of my theory. Based on law and professional standards, the potential for equal-status
intergroup contact is greatest in this arena. Even in relatively heterogenous communities, though,
some white students may attend largely-segregated private academies or public magnet schools

31

The relative impact of racial context on attitudes appears to diminish with less-specific spatial targeting. For the
individual-level unit of analysis, it is most appropriate to pin-down the context that most directly impacts
individuals.
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with varying degrees of diversity. They may also participate in homogeneous extracurricular
activities. I will discuss the further statistical implications of these facts below.
Modeling of multilevel data structures, such as the aforementioned one, can present
numerous statistical problems due to nesting and clustering (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In
Chapter 3, I displayed basic, juxtaposed analyses to further the discussion of context without
confounding these problems. As an advancement on that effort, I now present a combination of
levels that (I contend) provides even greater construct validity. The relative “intimacy” of the
school setting combined with the zip code setting provides the opportunity for political scientists
to proxy more effectively for contact.
Factor analysis (or latent variables analysis) is utilized in an attempt to incorporate each
of these variables into one single construct (Racial Context). Both the reality and the perception
of intergroup contact for individual respondents is thus captured. Although contextual variables
often prove highly-problematic in the social sciences, research has indicated that racially-based
conceptions may be the exception (Hopkins 2016). Essentially, we can logically assume some
correlation between actual and perceived demographic observations at these levels. However, the
attempt here is to build on that assumption.
Upon reviewing factor analyses of all combinations of the four variables that proxy for
contact, three of those (percentage of black residents in zip code, perception of percentage of
black residents in zip code, and percentage of black students in the high school of attendance)
exhibit high congruence.32 Preliminary analyses also appeared to show that the scaled responses
for contact in the school setting revealed self-selection data that did not exhibit such high
congruence.33 In plain language, the statistics seem to bear-out that a latent variable does indeed

32
33

Cronbach’s Alpha = .879
Cronbach’s Alpha = .333
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exist in this case. Using the Cronbach’s Alpha rule-of-thumb, I have designated that variable as
Racial Context (see Table 4.3.1). The higher the value for Racial Context, the more intergroup
contact is presumed to be present.
Table 4.3.1 Rotated Factor Loadings of Congruent Contextual Variables
Variable

Racial Context

Uniqueness

Percentage of Black Residents in Zip
Code

.903

.185

Perception of Percentage of
Black Residents in Zip Code

.846

.285

Percentage of Black Students in
the High School of Attendance

.755

.430

Following closely with other work in the racial attitudes literature, Gender (0 = Female, 1
= Male) and Income serve as “individual-level predictors” (Taylor, 519) for estimating white
racism. The income values within the dataset originate as ordinal data on a 7-Point Likert Scale
that indicates direction (as opposed to specific substantive values). Age, as well as education
level, are not included in my modeling here, as the cohort is almost entirely comprised of
university undergrads in their late teens and early twenties.
The natural log of Population for zip code serves as a “locality-level predictor” (Taylor,
519) in estimating white racism (exactly as in the previous Chapter). Again, I expect an inherent
difference in attitudes based upon urban and rural settings. Self-selection may play a role in
where one lives. By including this variable, I attempt to more accurately explain the realities
within black belt and non-black belt locales since black belt areas are typically more rural. Based
on past scholarship, this inclusion makes for a “tougher test” due to more liberal racial attitudes
typically being present in urban settings. Taylor’s analysis is focused on gleaning data from
metropolitan areas alone, whereas I incorporate rural areas as well.
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4.4

Testing
Due to the continuous nature of the dependent variable, I estimate OLS regression to

assess impact of Racial Context on White Prejudice in the Deep South for my fourth hypothesis.
Due to the count nature of the dependent variable for my fifth hypothesis, the properly-specified
model would be Poisson estimation. The method by which the data for the count variable was
gathered for White Discrimination (given the “black” treatment) allows me to assume that there
is a constant rate of occurrence as well as that the accumulated events are independent (there was
only one “count” per independent subject. Additionally, the summary statistics and distribution
align more fully with this model as opposed to a negative binomial estimation. Lastly, I employ a
basic t-test for my sixth hypothesis to compare White Discrimination (as related to raffle
donations to the “black” treatment) with that of White Discrimination (as related to raffle
donations to the “white” treatment).
4.5

Analyses
In Table 4.5.1, I address whether intergroup contact specifically impacts irrational

prejudicial attitudes. This estimation squares with my contention that living in black belt areas,
as well as diverse urban areas, seems to mitigate the development of prejudicial attitudes. The
sign for Racial Context is in the expected direction and I can state that, at a 90% confidence
interval, the relationship is significantly negative.
Table 4.5.1 Estimates of White Prejudice in Deep South Locales (2016)
Variable
Racial Context
Gender
Income
Population (ln)
Constant
N

β

Standard Error

p-value

-.346
-.851
-.162
-.005
1.592
91

(.192)
(.401)
(.111)
(.258)
(2.708)

.077
.038
.152
.983
.559
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Note: Parameter estimates are OLS regression estimates. The numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors computed in the usual fashion.

However, due to the innovative nature of the study, as well as the development of a new
method for operationalizing contextual factors, I can accept that more replication is in order.
There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis for 𝐻 , but that evidence may not be convincing
enough for many in the field.
As displayed in Figure 4.5.1, I have replicated the substantive empirical findings from
Chapter 3 with new rigor. The magnitude of the coefficient is nonsensical in the comparison. But
there is no reason to suggest that these findings are inconsistent, only that they may suffer from a
lack of a broader survey pool in the instance of the original survey experiment. The graphical
illustration contains confidence intervals calculated to 95%. There is considerable consistency
upon observing the like independent variables, even taking into consideration the different
instruments from which the data was gleaned (as well as the different strategies and methods
used in operationalizing).
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Figure 4.5.1 A Comparison of Analyses
Note: Brackets are 95% C.I.

Substantively, the lasting import of presenting these results is that they quite literally fly
in the face of those asserting that racial threat is a driving force for prejudicial attitudes. If the
intent of the theoretical development for threat has been to indicate otherwise (perhaps to say
that the system of racism is promoted by threat) then the proprietors of that development have
not communicated so clearly and consistently. Looking ahead, the testing of my fifth hypothesis
most likely serves as an olive branch for that assertion.
In Table 4.5.2, I present my first analysis relating to the dictator game experiment. This
test specifically addresses behaviors of discrimination related to threat. Some explanation is
necessary for interpreting these results. Since the giving of raffle tickets proxies for White
Discrimination, I would expect that the giving would be negatively impacted by a more-diverse
Racial Context. This is exactly the sign of the estimation given here. Since there is no control
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group in this experiment34, I have combined traditional quantitative methods with experimental
data.35 Treatment effects may not be homogeneous across all subjects, regardless of
randomization (which is exactly what I expect here). That is, there may be subgroups within the
treatment group that react to the treatment differently due to a moderating variable (i.e. Racial
Context). The issue here is technically about specificity of causal claims. We cannot anticipate
possessing perfect prior information about how subjects differ; but we can use what we already
know in order to group them accordingly. The statistical significance is particularly profound,
given discipline norms. Judging the relationship of attitudes to behaviors, the data provides a
stark contrast.
Table 4.5.2 Estimates of White Discrimination in Deep South Locales (2016)
Variable

β

Standard Error

p-value

Racial Context
-.185
(.079)
.020
Gender
.011
(.150)
.941
Income
-.000
(.048)
.995
Population (ln)
-.038
(.103)
.712
Constant
2.130
(1.072)
.047
N
51
6.20
𝜒
Log Likelihood
-109.100
Note: Parameter estimates are Poisson estimates. The numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors computed in the usual fashion.

Figure 4.5.2 more succinctly addresses probability via an odds-ratio of giving. Since
maximum likelihood estimators only allow us to determine significant directionality (as opposed
to magnitude), graphical illustrations provide more substantive meaning. In this case, the graph
illustrates that the number of observed events of giving divided by the number of expected

34

The absence of a control group primarily stems from constraints on obtaining enough participants in the original
study to warrant a more complex design. Given additional resources, a third treatment would be an intriguing
prospect (perhaps without an accompanying picture of the “research assistant”.)
35
In several cases, this type of strategy may over-complicate the results of a well-executed experiment. I have
utilized this method, however, in order to illustrate the divergent effects on attitudes and behaviors as described in
the fourth and fifth hypotheses.
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events of giving is significantly less given the effects of Racial Context. The result is
significantly lower than what we would expect absent of the effects. Again, we can assume that
one observation has not impacted another based on the nature of the experiment.

Figure 4.5.2 Odds Ratio of White Discrimination
Figure 4.5.3 provides a straightforward illustration of the effects of Racial Context on
both treatment groups. The linear fit graph shows that, to a great degree, estimates of behaviors
are simply not the same. Though traditionally used in the discipline, linear fits for count models
do contain problems of inefficiency and bias. I pause at rejecting H50 on statistical grounds alone
(based on the relatively low number of respondents.) I will make the point, however, that all
indications are consistent with my theoretical development to this point. The difficulty in
accounting for the specific expected number of raffle tickets donated does not constitute an
overall denouncement of the central proposition.
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Figure 4.5.3 A Comparison of Economic Behaviors
The estimates of divergent economic behaviors for Southern whites appear to show a
distinct pattern that only widens given extremes in contact. In interpreting the graph above, it is
important to remember that perception is included in the context. Thus, what might at first glance
seem to be a convergence of behavior at some “happy medium” of contact is actually an
illustration of how equal status conditions based on the latent variable of context may alleviate
large inequities in behavior.
These estimations hinge on the inclusion of Racial Context in the formulation. Absent of
that nuance, the aggregate behaviors of Southern whites are still called into question. We assume
the lasting effects of these behaviors as economic inequalities. But the individual-level processes
that support systemic racism have often escaped our capacities for explanation.
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Table 4.5.3 shows the results of a t-test in relation to my sixth and final hypothesis. On
the surface, giving is (on the average) higher in the black treatment group, though the difference
in means is clearly within the statistical “margin of error.”
Table 4.5.3 Summary Statistics and Difference of Proportions t-test for White Discrimination in
the Deep South (2016)

Proportions of White Discrimination
N
p-value

Black Treatment
5.490
51

White Treatment
4.600
40
.228

Essentially, then, there is little to no observable difference in the economic behaviors of
Southern whites overall (H6A). Discrimination, in this rendering, appears to simply rest upon the
individual calculus of the subject (with little regard to racial framing). Only when we dig deeper
into the proverbial homes and schools of individuals might we find evidence of the threat that
manifests into discrimination under the right conditions. If these conclusions are truly externally
valid on the whole, then properly identifying those conditions is paramount.
4.6

Discussion
What I have sought to improve upon in this Chapter are both the methods used and the

specificity with which I have tested for prejudice and discrimination. By separating out these
constructs, I have demonstrated that analyzing data for one does not constitute evidence for both.
Additionally, I have designed a survey experiment explicitly intended to test for prejudice while
limiting social desirability bias. I have also devised a way to test for discrimination using an
experiment that has heretofore not been attempted on the specific population of interest.
The replicated results (with regard to the national survey analyses) address the state of
racism within the Deep South in a new and contemporary light. In Chapter 3, I asserted that the
process of contact is simply different within and outside of the Deep South. Thus, the uncovered
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paradox of thought and action supports my theory for this region. What that paradox does not do
is reveal any lessening of racism for any particular part of the nation overall.
In recognizing that individuals may make decisions that conflict with their attitudes and
opinions, though, I have uncovered perhaps the crux of what contributes to systemic racial
inequality in Chapter 4. Economic decisions, or decisions based in the perceived threat of one’s
relative advantage from a large out-group, affect the extent to which one is willing to invest in
another (even another within one’s in-group). The cumulative effects of such behavior affect
historic minority groups most, as economic advantages will continue to rest with those that
already enjoy them.
And so, in addressing the state of systemic racism as a construct, the most vital of its
support comes from those that utilize protectionist strategies in their day-to-day lives. And while
that notion, on the surface, may appear to be simply rational in the economic context, the utility
of racially-pluralistic behaviors has not been sufficiently vetted as an alternative to this point.
In the following Chapter, I will endeavor to accomplish a few final goals. Firstly, I will
offer further reasoning on why it is important for social scientists to continue this work on the
Deep South. Secondly, I will seek to highlight some stark contemporary evidence that something
is (indeed) different in this arena. In doing so, I seek to persuade others that it is paramount to
continue seeking out new and innovative approaches to fully realizing what that difference is.
Lastly, I will offer an original research avenue that is open for robust criticism while providing a
brief case study opportunity for anyone who wishes to test the boundaries of my final
propositions.

81

5

CHAPTER 5: BACK TO THE ARENA

“Everyone in the South has no time for reading because they are all too busy writing.”
William Faulkner, in Conversations with William Faulkner
Where do we go from here? In a very broad sense, I have attempted to make the case that
there is significant evidence to support the idea that de jure changes have led to de facto results.
Always a point of contention, assertions that racism has been counteracted in the South are often
put to rest by realities on the ground. I have attempted to redefine the construct of racism so as to
further the conversation, rather than to be lost in a myriad of competing voices.
The positive results of public policy for promoting integrated public services and,
specifically, schooling, are touted as lessening prejudice. However, the changing dynamics of a
racist institution have also created the dueling narrative of discrimination brought on by real or
perceived economic threats. Most specifically, I have highlighted the black belt and other highlydiverse geographic regions within the Deep South as being ground-zero for uncovering the data
necessary to these conclusions.
Akin to the musings of Faulkner above, it may well be that academic Southerners and
non-Southerners alike have long-ignored the evidence needed to clearly define familiar terms
like racism, prejudice, and discrimination so that scientific progress can be made. In our haste as
a community of scholars, many have offered explanation without returning to the foundational
source of the topic. Beyond political science, anthropologists and sociologists would be wellserved to conduct intense participant-observation research in the rural and urban centers of Deep
South multi-culturalism. The topic of race is openly-discussed in the South daily. However, it is
also a topic that is avoided daily. I would argue that the reason for avoidance is a lack of
metaphorical “reading.”
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Comparative political scientists also have a lot to gain in this arena. Whereas area
specialists traditionally look beyond America’s borders for the development of rich cultural,
structural, and game theory, the formal modeling of the intersection of racial threat and contact
in our own “backyard” provides ample opportunities close to home.
For the fellow traditional Americanist, it will remain vital to stay the course on the long
road to understanding local Southern cultures. Evaluating prejudice and discrimination via
political and economic processes alone misses the point. Concurrent social processes are also at
hand (and have been for some time) that provide the fertile ground for growing non-zero-sum
environments in a changing landscape. In military service and professional sports especially,
history is on the side of equal status contact being fruitful. Systemic racism is not a constant
monolith. But proper statistical modeling and experimentation alone cannot forge that
understanding. Sound research methods, to include participant-observation and a re-evaluation of
history, can allow us to provide more insight through our work.
In Chapter 1, I referenced the work of Glaser and Ryan (2013) prominently. In doing so, I
recognized that their conclusions are the closest to my own formative thoughts on the politics of
race in the South. They find that specific instances may present themselves in which rational
actors of both races may overcome an impetus for racially-protectionist policy decisions (such as
in local school-funding referendums). Unlike the results in this study, they do still assert that
prejudice is the basis for those policies at the outset. Notwithstanding the theoretical differences,
the potential for combatting discrimination is well-noted.
At the center of our combined efforts to construct a normative bridge towards increased
liberality and democracy, political scientists must remember that politics is essentially about
“Who Gets What” (Lasswell 1936). And beyond equal-status conditions that are mandated by
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law in the public sphere, we should be on the lookout for the opportunities that exist in our
neighborhoods and on our city streets that are consequential to the game of politics played
between people of different races daily.
The implications for doing so are far-reaching. The targeted scope of this project has
been limited to analyzing black and white relations in a specific region alone, but there are
countless other contemporary iterations of study that can gain from doing this job well. For
instance, if the study of cooperative games is the next step towards correctly specifying the
power conditions of any majoritarian/minority dynamic, then the methodological groundwork
can be laid here in an analysis of a non-cooperative status quo.
5.1

Contrasts in Response
In June of 2015, nine black parishioners were killed in a Charleston, South Carolina

church in a targeted hate crime. In the ensuing weeks, the grace of the victims and their families
led to a response that only the most extreme of idealists could have imagined in the original
birthplace of secession. The Confederate battle flag, adorning the top of the State House for most
of the previous fifty-four years, came down.
The rapidity of that response, alongside the bi-partisanship and multi-racial support with
which it was largely and quickly embraced, was unique within a national climate that had been
shocked by numerous events outside of the Deep South, beginning with the killing of Trayvon
Martin in 2012. By 2014, the number of unarmed black men killed by (mostly white) authorities
became a national epidemic, prompting the Black Lives Matter movement. 36

36

Dontre Hamilton (Milwaukee, Wisconsin); Eric Garner (New York City, New York); John Crawford III (Dayton,
Ohio); Ezell Ford (Florence, California); Dante Parker (Victorville, California); Tanisha Anderson (Cleveland,
Ohio); Akai Gurley (Brooklyn, New York); Tamir Rice (Cleveland, Ohio); Rumain Brisbon (Phoenix, Arizona);
Jerame Reid (Bridgeton, New Jersey).
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Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland notably erupted into violent rioting. But in
South Carolina, the response was very different. Then-Governor Nikki Haley commented on the
shift, “South Carolina did not respond with rioting and violence, like other places have. We
responded by talking to each other, putting ourselves in each other’s shoes, and finding common
ground in the name of moving our state forward.... This State House belongs to all of us.” 37
Much of the credit for the eventual removal was given to younger (mostly-white)
lawmakers in the General Assembly, who had grown up knowing only integration. Even the son
of Strom Thurmond, the original “Dixiecrat,” agreed that the time for change was at-hand.
However, the true seeds of the removal rested with black leaders who had campaigned for
decades on the issue. What changed in the wake of the tragedy amounted to shift in the relative
conditions of power. Once both black and white South Carolinians were joined in empathy, the
barriers to a racially-pluralistic response were lifted.
In the following section, I will present a potential “next step” for political scientists to
consider when studying the Deep South, or the South in general. The intent is not to conflate the
very traumatic experience of the Mother Emanuel shooting with simple equal-status conditions.
Neither is it an effort to contrast a certain viewpoint of the Deep South with that of the rest of the
nation. Instead, it is a modest work built upon the history of a racially-diverse region that has
weathered many storms in advance.
5.2

Prescription
In this section, I outline a simple game of Deep South Intergroup Contact for further

development within the discipline of political science. The implications for outlining a response
to seemingly intractable discrimination exist within. In summation, this game illustrates the

37

As quoted in The State newspaper (July 11, 2015).
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relative “irrationality” of hoarding a perceived or real advantage for one’s own in-group in the
midst of other well-positioned out-groups. Even in the context of a very white racial context, the
benefits of discrimination are called into question.
This game is two-player, simultaneous, non-zero-sum, but also non-cooperative in the
present conception.38 First, I define the players, choices, and payoffs. Secondly, I specify the
utility functions for each player. Third, I list the assumptions of the game. Lastly, I illustrate the
strategic matrix and discuss the shifting of the Nash equilibrium at two different states of nature.
The players are one white individual or group (W) and one black individual or group (B).
In this game, a social situation arises in which W (in direct contact with B) must choose to act in
either a discriminatory or non-discriminatory manner. In the same social situation, B (in direct
contact with W) must simultaneously choose to respond or not respond to the perceived racial
elements of W’s choice.
The payoffs for these choices are a utility function of some constant social, political, and
economic status S, which is shared by both W and B at the beginning of the game. In plain
language, the choices made by both players can impact their overall status for the better or worse
because they may either gain or lose status from the other player.
To illustrate: W may choose to act in a discriminatory manner and B may choose not to
respond. The expected utility of W then reflects some constant status S plus that additional status
which has been “cheated” away from player B (e.g. a white player may overcharge a black player
for some service rendered at a place of business). On the other side, B has forfeited any status
gains possible from W, as well as his or her own power to avoid being “cheated.” However, if B

38

It is not dependent upon ideal cooperative situations.
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chooses to respond to racist behavior (e.g. a boycott of the place of business), then “cheating” is
no longer possible, and W incurs the costs of his or her behavior.
The primary variables introduced into the function account for both the magnitude of S
that can be added or subtracted as well as the chance that B will respond. These variables are PW
(percent white) and PB (percent black) and represent the simplified demographic states of nature
(Racial Context) in which the game is played.39 PR (chance of response) is assumed to be equal
to PB. It is important to note that I am not introducing probabilities in order to model mixed
strategies here. Instead, the chance of response is incorporated into the utility function as a way
of modeling the relative impact of any action player B might choose, given the population
parameters.
Essentially, the utility functions for each player and his or her choices are as follows:
Player W
Discriminatory/No Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)
Discriminatory/Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (𝑃 )(𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆)
Non-Discriminatory/No Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)
Non-Discriminatory/Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)
Player B
Discriminatory/No Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆)
Discriminatory/Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (𝑃 )(𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆)
Non-Discriminatory/No Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)
Non-Discriminatory/Response 𝐸(𝑈) = (𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)
The assumptions inherent in the model are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Each player maintains ordinal preferences, seeking the highest utility possible.
There is complete and perfect information.
Decisions are made under the conditions of certainty.
Each player is unencumbered by “deeply rooted” prejudice (Allport 1954,
281).
5. S > 0
39

5.

One of the key “next-steps” for this model is to incorporate the new Racial Context variable described in Chapter
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6. S is constant.
7. 𝑃 + 𝑃 = 1
8. The probability of a response for player B (PR) is directly proportional to PB at
a 1:1 ratio.
9. The players may not gain or lose status from themselves or their own group,
except when Player B forfeits all status by not responding to discrimination
from player W.

No Response
Disc.

Player W

Player B

Response

(1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆), (1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆)

(𝑃 )(𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆), (𝑃 )(𝑆 − 𝑃 𝑆)

(1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆), (1 − 𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)

(𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆), (𝑃 )(𝑆 + 𝑃 𝑆)

Non-Disc.

Figure 5.2.1 The Intergroup Contact Game
An advantage of the formal matrix prescribed (Figure 5.2.1) is the ability to predict
behaviors without regard to altruism (a topic previously discussed). In the dictator game
experiment, I employed randomization of racial frames to neutralize the potential that altruism
was being tested. Certainly, prejudices and goodwill do exist in the real world, as well as
lingering de facto inequities. However, this game allows us to simply propose a rational set of
actions for the actors involved at different states of nature. The propositions implied inform
much further discussion.
The solutions to each of the games presented in Figure 5.2.2 are surrounded in bold.
When solving for all possible states of nature, it can be noted that the Nash equilibrium shifts
from the lower left quadrant to the lower right quadrant at exactly a 50/50 population
distribution.40 The model thus proposes [Proposition 1] that it will always be in the best interests
of the white individual or group to act in a non-discriminatory manner, regardless of local
populations. However, the model also proposes [Proposition 2] that it is in the best interests of

40

See Figure 5.5.2 for prior support of this specification.
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the black individual or group to respond only once PB reaches at least .5. Additionally, an
interesting phenomenon within the model proof posits that both players derive the largest utilities
possible in each game at the equilibrium. In fact, the smallest populations derive the most utility.
Thus, a corollary to each proposition might state that all players derive the maximum utility from
the choices at equilibrium, particularly the choices of player B.

No Response
Disc.

Player B

Response

(. 8)(𝑆 + .2𝑆), (. 8)(𝑆 − .8𝑆 − .2𝑆)

(. 2)(𝑆 − .2𝑆), (. 2)(𝑆 − .8𝑆)

(.8)(𝑆 + .2𝑆), (.8)(𝑆 + .8𝑆)

(. 2)(𝑆 + .2𝑆), (. 2)(𝑆 + .8𝑆)

Player W
Non-Disc.

Note: This version of the game is played when the local population is 80% white and 20% black.

No Response
Disc.

Player B

Response

(. 2)(𝑆 + .8𝑆), (. 2)(𝑆 − .2𝑆 − .8𝑆)

(. 8)(𝑆 − .8𝑆), (. 8)(𝑆 − .2𝑆)

(.2)(𝑆 + .8𝑆), (.2)(𝑆 + .2𝑆)

(. 8)(𝑆 + .8𝑆), (. 8)(𝑆 + .2𝑆)

Player W
Non-Disc.

Note: This version of the game is played when the local population is 20% white and 80% black.

Figure 5.2.2 Two Solutions for The Intergroup Contact Game
Substantively, then, what do these propositions provide? On the one hand, this model
implies that discriminatory behavior is simply irrational in a world with equal status. Within the
game, the choice and ability to respond expresses these rights and protections for player B. On
the other hand, it appears that player B’s choice holds some important substantive significance
for the whole of society, both in determining payoffs to both sides and also in shifting the
calculus of player W.
Further development of this formal modeling could conceivably lead to a more articulate
and sophisticated specification for the conditions in which white Southerners can reach beyond
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the impetus for discrimination. In reality, the onus will be on the researcher to identify not only
the conditions, but also the framing by which individuals can conceive of mutual gain through
cooperation (a game that I am not prepared to present in this context). The pervasive historical
response is that specified by Hobbes: pre-emptive “attack.” However, if the work I have done
here provides any reasonable silver lining, it is that things can and do change.
My sincere hope is that we can, as a scientific community, change in promoting this type
of modeling in our applied endeavors moving forward. In an effort to exhibit the real-world
consequences of how the Intergroup Contact Game plays out in different contexts, I will return to
the original arena.
5.3

A Reunion
In the fall of 2018, alumni from Americus High School will meet for several reunions on

Homecoming. The Class of 1999 will organize for the first time since 2008, in honor of the
twentieth year since their graduation. The high school they will return to is no longer named
“Americus,” but is now Americus-Sumter High School (owing to a City and County Schools
merger). The impetus for the merger was birthed in early activism by Sumter County Board of
Education Representatives in the 1950s and 1960s (notably Jimmy Carter). They sought to
counteract what was, in those times, a system that saw the white children go to the City and the
black children go to the County.
What followed in the years after full-scale integration, however, was a realignment of the
status quo without further legal force. By the late 1990s, the City Schools maintained a much
higher racial diversity than the County Schools (while also boasting of balanced budgets and
better overall facilities). In addition, teachers, coaches, and administrators of color dominated the
City Schools whereas the County Schools were led almost entirely by whites. The early
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progressive efforts quite literally morphed into a process that eventually had vast unintended
effects.
Since their graduation, most of the white alumni of the Americus Class of 1999 have
moved away from their home town and have not been active in efforts to reunite. A majority of
those that do remain actually send their own children to out-of-district schools in neighboring
counties. Some even choose to support the local private academy (Southland) that was founded
in the years immediately following integration.
This type of story is not unique. In Georgia alone, mergers and full-scale movement of
white students to new schools has forged the histories of countless Deep South communities like
LaGrange, Rome, Athens, and Valdosta. The modest equal status that did exist in the few
decades following integration of the public education systems there have evolved into a very
different form of private self-selection. Not only have white families moved away, but they have
also often rescinded their financial support for the multi-cultural learning environments that
fostered them. Subsequent financial investment in new business and infrastructure has also
sought “whiter” pastures elsewhere.
Very few communities remain that support the same integrated institutions that existed at
the conclusion of “Reconstruction.” In applying anecdotal contemporary observations to this
reality, one can observe higher wages and standards of living for people of all races in those
scattered towns and cities like Buford, Thomasville, Moultrie, Cartersville, and Carrollton.
When the Class of 1999 comes together at a school that will surely feel somewhat alien to
them (Americus-Sumter High School), they will reunite with a community of peers that shared
the experience of growing up in a place that combatted prejudice daily following the infamous
cover on Life magazine. However, the harsh reality of discrimination will also be clearly evident
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if reunion photos are filled only with black and brown faces. Active engagement by white
Southerners in multi-racial social settings is the key to realizing equal status for all. At least in
one small instance, in an isolated Deep South and black belt town, that remains a hopeful
possibility.
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APPENDIX
Survey Experiment Design
I.

II.

Research Design
A. The type of research proposed is a survey instrument with an embedded
“dictator game” experiment. The entire survey and experiment is
contained within an electronic-based instrument designed in Qualtrics.
This survey and experiment will be completed online. A consent form
precedes the survey. The subsequent survey data will mainly serve to
establish many of the demographic variables of interest, though attitudinal
data is also gathered. Questions will be answered with regard to race,
gender, age, etc. In addition, subjects will be asked to describe the “racial
environment” of their hometown. Both specific data linked to the U.S.
Census as well as data on subjects’ perceptions will be collected. The
experiment will involve a single-test only, randomized design that will
allow subjects to choose to “share” with either a black or white fictitious
individual. The “sharing” behavior proxies for a measure of racial
discrimination. Specifically, the experiment proceeds as follows:
Individuals will be thanked for participating at the conclusion of the
survey questions. They will then be “given” 10 raffle tickets to do with as
they please. Though there is no actual prize, deception is utilized in order
to foster the belief that they may have something to gain by their choice.
Thus, they are given the role of a dictator. They can act with complete
self-interest or with a measure of altruism. A fictitious research assistant is
presented as the individual with whom they may share their tickets. This
research assistant differs in race according to the randomization of the
treatment (i.e. one research assistant appears to be “White” and one
research assistant appears to be “Black”). They choose how to allocate
their tickets, and the survey ends. Due to randomization, we can assume
that the only thing that differs between the two sub-populations tested is
the race of the research assistant that they allocate to. Thus, the number of
tickets allocated provides insight on the subject of discrimination. When
coupled with the attitudinal data, the overall design should provide
necessary insight for answering the primary research question. It should
also allow the researchers the ability to test how closely the attitudes
measured in the survey align with the behaviors exhibited in the
experiment.
Detailed Study Procedures
A. The data collection process is completely confidential via Qualtrics. Data
collection, itself, should not take more than 10 minutes per subject. The
timeline for collection is estimated to be no more than a semester (or less).
The data will first be handled by the data administrator of the Political
Science Research Pool. At the point the primary investigators are given
the data, all identifying variables will have been removed by the
administrator and a survey ID will have taken its place. The information
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III.

provided will be stored in password-protected and fire-walled computers.
No identifying information will be presented or published as a result of
this study. No individuals will be identified personally, and all findings
will be summarized via group statistics (OLS and MLE estimation).
Data and Analysis
A. Sample
The sample will be gathered from the Political Science Research Pool at
GSU on a volunteer-basis. Subjects are GSU undergraduate students who
are enrolled in required American Government courses. The sample size is
anticipated to be around 200 in total. This number is compatible with OLS
and MLE statistical modeling.
B. Measurement / Instrumentation
The variables of interest are as follows: Race, Age, Gender, Ideology,
Relative Prejudice (as measured via an index of three questions),
Demographics of Hometown/Secondary School, Perceived Demographic
Makeup of Home Community, Perceived Interracial Contact in Home
Environment, Extent of “Sharing” with a Black/White Individual (as a
proxy for Discrimination).
The survey measurement techniques utilized are consistent with a wealth
of racial attitudes research. The dictator game, likewise, has been utilized
in many political science experiments.
The data will be collected online via GSU Qualtrics.
C. Methodology
The data will be analyzed using Stata statistical software. Appropriate
modeling will be dependent upon the nature of the dependent variable
(continuous, discrete, etc.) as well as the distribution of the data. It is
anticipated that OLS and Ordered Probit will be appropriate.
Relative levels of “prejudice” and “discrimination” will serve as primary
dependent variables.
“Prejudice” will be measured as the distance between one’s opinions of
other races juxtaposed with one’s own race. This method is consistent with
a host of prior research.
Independent moderating variables for “discrimination” will include an
interaction term of demographic makeup and perceived demographic
makeup on two levels (the home community and the secondary school).
The independent mediating variable for “discrimination” will be the racial
treatment itself.

Survey Instrument
Prejudice and Discrimination: A Dictator Game Experiment
You may skip any questions that you prefer not to answer – no questions are required to
continue.

Demographic Questions:
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Q1 What is your age?

Q2 What is your gender?
 Female
 Male
Q3 What racial group do you identify with?*








White
Black
Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)
Asian or Pacific Islander
Native American
Multi-Racial
Other

*Non-white participants who may have overlooked the statement that this study is focused on
white racial attitudes alone will end the survey here.

Q4 What is the zip code of your hometown?

To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the population percentages of the following racial
groups in your home community:

Q5 Whites:

Q6 Blacks:

Q7 Hispanic or Latino (Non-White):

Q8 What high school did you graduate from?
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To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the amount of personal contact you had with
members of the following racial groups in your home community (including your educational
environment):

Q9 Whites:








Almost Never
Very Little
Somewhat Less than Other Groups
About the Same as Other Groups
Somewhat More than Other Groups
A Great Deal
Almost Always

Q10 Blacks:








Almost Never
Very Little
Somewhat Less than Other Groups
About the Same as Other Groups
Somewhat More than Other Groups
A Great Deal
Almost Always

Q11 Hispanic or Latino (Non-White):








Almost Never
Very Little
Somewhat Less than Other Groups
About the Same as Other Groups
Somewhat More than Other Groups
A Great Deal
Almost Always

Q12 To the best of your ability, please estimate your yearly household income before taxes.
Include the total income of all adults (like your parents) living at your home address.








under $10,000
$10,000 - $24,999
$25,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 -$149,999
$150,000 and over

104

Attitudinal Questions:

Q13 If you were to rank yourself with regard to political ideology, where would you fall on the
following scale?








Extremely Liberal
Very Liberal
Somewhat Liberal
Neither Liberal nor Conservative: "Middle of the Road"
Somewhat Conservative
Very Conservative
Extremely Conservative

Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a sevenpoint scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a
score of 1 means that you consider almost all of the people in that group to be "intelligent". A
score of 7 means that you consider almost everyone in the group to be "unintelligent". A score of
4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may
choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

Q14 Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?








1 - Intelligent
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Unintelligent

Q15 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale?








1 - Intelligent
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Unintelligent
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Q16 Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos (Non-White) in general on this scale?








1 - Intelligent
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Unintelligent

In the second statement a score of 1 means that you consider almost all of the people in that
group to be "hard-working". A score of 7 means that you consider almost everyone in the group
to be "lazy". A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and
of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people
in the group stand.

Q17 Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?








1 - Hard-working
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Lazy

Q18 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale?








1 - Hard-working
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Lazy
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Q19 Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos (Non-White) in general on this scale?








1 - Hard-working
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Lazy

In the third statement a score of 1 means that you consider almost all of the people in that group
to be “very committed to strong families”. A score of 7 means that you consider almost everyone
in the group to be “lacking a commitment to strong families”. A score of 4 means you think that
the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in
between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

Q20 Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?








1 - Very committed to strong families
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Lacking a commitment to strong families

Q21 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale?








1 - Very committed to strong families
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Lacking a commitment to strong families
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Q22 Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos (Non-White) in general on this scale?








1 - Very committed to strong families
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Lacking a commitment to strong families

Now I have some questions about different political institutions in our country. I’m going to
show you a seven-point scale on which you can evaluate these institutions. In the first statement
a score of 1 means that you consider the current performance of that institution to be "excellent."
A score of 7 means that you consider the current performance of that institution to be "poor." A
score of 4 means you think that the institution is not towards one end or another, and of course
you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think the institution
stands.
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Q23 Where would you rate the Presidency on this scale?








1 - Excellent
2
3
4
5
6
7 – Poor

Q24 Where would you rate Congress on this scale?








1 - Excellent
2
3
4
5
6
7 – Poor

Q25 Where would you rate the Supreme Court on this scale?








1 - Excellent
2
3
4
5
6
7 – Poor
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Randomized Treatments:
Participants will randomly receive one of the two following experimental treatments. The only
substantive difference in the treatments is the race of the fictional “research assistant”.

Q26B Thank you for taking part in this survey. As a token of
gratitude, you have been given ten raffle tickets assigned to your survey ID. You may choose to
keep any number of the raffle tickets for yourself, or you may choose to donate any number to a
Political Science research assistant. How many raffle tickets would you like to donate to my
research assistant (Derek) on the left?












0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Q26W Thank you for taking part in this survey. As a token of
gratitude, you have been given ten raffle tickets assigned to your survey ID. You may choose to
keep any number of the raffle tickets for yourself, or you may choose to donate any number to a
Political Science research assistant. How many raffle tickets would you like to donate to my
research assistant (Derek) on the left?
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